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JURISDICTION AND CASE HISTORY
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i), as this matter is an
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil action in
which the Third District Court granted defendants* motions for
summary judgment and motion for protective order.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was it error for the district court to enter summary

judgment against the Hotels on their claim that the Innkeeper
License Tax created an improper tax classification such that
its operation is discriminatory, arbitrary and an abuse of
taxing power, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 and
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution?
2.

Was it error for the district court to issue a

protective order prohibiting discovery of the amount of taxes
paid by Innkeepers to Salt Lake City on the basis that such
information is irrelevant to the issues in this case?
3.

Was it error for the district court to enter summary

judgment against the Hotels on their claim that the Innkeeper
License Tax is an illegal sales or income tax?
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CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES k RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1:
****No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7:
Sect. 7

[Due process of law,]

No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 (1986):
License fees and taxes.
They may raise revenue by levying and
collecting a license fee or tax on any
business within the limits of the city, and
regulate the same by ordinance; provided,
that no Utah city or town shall collect a
license fee or tax hereunder from any
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains
orders for or sells goods in such city or
town solely for resale; and no enumeration
of powers of cities contained in this
chapter, shall be deemed to limit or
restrict the general grant of authority
hereby conferred. All such license fees and
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the
class upon which they are imposed.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-31-1 through 6 (1987)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-301, 302 (supp. 1987)
See Exhibit 7 of Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a challenge to Salt Lake City's
Innkeeper License Tax (hereinafter "Innkeeper Tax"), adopted in
June, 1982, which imposes a license tax of one percent of gross
revenues for rental of rooms to persons for less than 30 days.
(R. 5-7, 228 and Addendum, Exhibit 1.)

The appellants are

Little America Hotel Corporation (hereinafter "LAHCO") and Utah
Hotel Company ("Hotel Utah") who will be referred to jointly
herein as "Hotels". The complaints of the Hotels, which were
amended and consolidated by the courts below, allege that the
Innkeeper Tax imposes substantial additional tax liability on
the Hotels and on the entire class subject to the Innkeeper Tax
(hereinafter referred to as "Innkeepers").

It is alleged that

the Innkeeper Tax adds a tax burden to Innkeepers in addition
to taxes already paid by them, which would be grossly
disproportionate to any municipal services and benefits
received by them from Salt Lake City (hereinafter "SLC").
Hotels allege the ordinance to be unconstitutional, void, and
ultra vires under the United States and Utah Constitutions and
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 for failing to operate
uniformly all persons similarly situated.

It is alleged that

the Innkeeper Tax is arbitrary and discriminatory.

Hotel Utah

further alleges that the power to impose a gross receipts tax
on Innkeepers has been statutorily delegated to the counties,
- 3 -

is beyond the authority of SLC, and that the tax is illegal as
being a tax on income, or a sales tax.

(R.939-951.) (The

various amended complaints and orders of consolidation are
found at R. 2-4, 19-21, 878-83, 890-902, 906-912, 939-51,
987-95, 997-98, 1113-24, 1145-57, 1160-61, 1238-52, 1292-95.)
Hotel Utah and SLC filed cross motions for summary
judgment.

Both SLC and LAHCO filed affidavits with regard to

the motion for summary judgment.
R800-834o)
Decision.

(R.137-242, R.284-380,

Thereafter, the trial court entered its Memorandum
(R.913-917 and Addendum, Exhibit 2.)

The court,

determining that summary judgment on most issues would be
appropriate, stated:
The court finds in favor of the Defendants
and against the Plaintiffs on all legal
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions,
together with those suggested in the
supporting Memoranda, with the exception of
the issue of "classification" and whether or
not such a classification is arbitrary
and/or discriminatory. A determination of
the issue of the reasonableness of the
classification under the circumstances of
this case must be based on the facts as they
may eventually be found by a trier of fact.
(R. 915)
The Court found that the affidavits made clear that issues of
fact remain for resolution at trial on the classification
issue.

(R.915.)

Thereafter, the Court entered its Judgment on

Motions for Summary Judgment, which stated:

- 4 -

All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed
with prejudice, excepting only the issue of
the legality of tax classification of the
city ordinance subject of the within dispute
and whether or not such classification is
arbitrary and/or discriminatory as applied.
(R.924-25.)
In order to obtain information regarding the taxes paid by
Innkeepers to SLC, LAHCO subpoenaed the records of UP&L with
regard to the utility franchise taxes paid by Innkeepers.

It

requested summary data according to a group of motels and not
information as to any one customer.
Exhibit 3.)

(R.1080-1081 and Addendum,

After a hearing, the Court entered its Memorandum

Decision (R.1135-38, and Addendum, Exhibit 4 ) , and stated:
Whether or not the benefits received by the
plaintiff from the defendant bears any
relationship to the taxes paid is not an
issue that remains for determination. The
Court's prior ruling on the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such
a claim, and by this Memorandum any
ambiguity contained in either the Memorandum
decision or the subsequent Order signed by
the Court is resolved. The only remaining
issue is whether or not the tax
classification in question is arbitrary
and/or discriminatory as applied.
(R.1136-37.)
Following the Memorandum Decision, the Court entered its
Order Clarifying Partial Summary Judgment and Granting
Protective Order, which granted a protective order against the
information sought from UP&L and clarified the earlier partial

- 5 -

Summary Judgment ruling as stated in the Court's Memorandum
decision.

(R.1141-43.)

Thereafter, LAHCO admitted in answers

to interrogatories that it had "no evidence that the ordinance
has been arbitrarily applied or discriminatorily applied, with
the understanding that those terms mean that the ordinance was
applied to LAHCO and not other members of the class subject to
the tax imposed by the ordinance," i.e., other Innkeepers.
(R.1208.)

Thereafter, SLC again made Motion for Summary

Judgment on all remaining issues, which was granted by the
Court on July 7, 1987.

(R.1296-98.)

In addition to the preceding procedural history, the
following are the relevant facts as shown by the record in the
court below:
1.

In June, 1982, the Salt Lake City Council passed an

ordinance imposing a special license tax on Innkeepers (the
"Innkeeper Tax") in the amount of one percent of the gross
revenue derived from rental of rooms for less than 30 days.
Section 20-3-15, Salt Lake City Ordinances.
Addendum, Exhibit 1.)

(R 5-7, 228 and

The Innkeeper Tax was first proposed at

a rate of 3% of such revenues.

(R.469.)

License taxes for all

other businesses in Salt Lake City, except public utilities,
are charged at the rate of $50.00 per place of business, plus
$5.00 per employee.

(Section 20-3-2, Salt Lake City
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Ordinances, R.221).

All license taxes are imposed for general

revenue purposes of the City.

(Salt Lake City Ordinances,

Section 20-3-12.3, R.224.)
2.

If LAHCO were subject to the license tax rate applied

to other businesses in SLC, it would pay a yearly tax of
$5,107.

If the Innkeeper Tax had been imposed in 1981, it

would have imposed a total tax on LAHCO of more than $119,000.
This represents a 2,300 percent increase in the license tax
over the amount that would otherwise be paid by LAHCO.

Had it

been in effect in 1981, the Innkeeper Tax would have increased
taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC for the Little America Hotel by 42%
overall.

(Affidavit of Merrill Norman, R.810-834, at 818 and

Addendum, Exhibit 5.)

The Innkeeper Tax is collected in

addition to sales tax, property tax, utility franchise tax, and
the 3% transient room tax already imposed by county government
and paid by Innkeepers and their guests.
3.

(Id., R.817, 824.)

In considering the impact of the Innkeeper Tax, SLC

administrative personnel compared the sales, property and
franchise taxes paid by residents to sales taxes paid by
visitors to the City.

(Exhibit 2-J to Defendant's answers to

LAHCO's First Set of Interrogatories, R.444.)

However, since

the purpose of the comparison is to determine the fairness of
the tax on Innkeepers by considering the effect of such a tax
when passed through to their guests, the taxes paid by
- 7 -

Innkeepers relating to these visitors' Salt Lake City
residences (the Hotels and Motels) should also be considered.
(Norman Affidavit, Paragraph 21, R.817.)

When these figures

are also included, it is apparent that taxes paid by enough
LAHCO guests to account for a total of one year in the city by
one person (a resident equivalent) is $317.00, compared to
$130o00 per resident, without considering the additional taxes
raised by the Innkeeper Tax.

The Innkeeper Tax adds an

additional $139.00 to that tax burden.

(id.)

These figures do

not include the transient room tax imposed by Salt Lake County
pursuant to statutory authority, which adds an additional
$418.00 per resident equivalent to the tax burden.

SLC taxed

Innkeepers and their guests more heavily than other businesses
and residents even before the imposition of the Innkeeper Tax.
(id.)
4.

As justification for the Innkeeper Tax, SLC attempted

to establish that Innkeepers taxed by the ordinance
(a) received the benefit of more city services and
expenditures, or (b) cost the city more money than other
businesses, residents, or property owners.

(Affidavit of Lewis

E. Miller, R.189-191; Affidavit of E.L. "Bud" Willoughby,
R.199-201; and Affidavit of Peter O. Pederson, R.195-98.)

SLC

made no attempt to relate these factors to the amount of tax
imposed.

There is also evidence in the record contradictory to

the statements in these affidavits.
- 8 -

5.

In his affidavit, Police Chief Bud Willoughby

expressed the opinion that the transient nature of hotel and
motel guests renders them susceptible to a high degree of
criminal activity.

(R.200.)

LAHCO, however, provides its own

security force at an annual expense of nearly $100,000, which
performs police functions on the premises.
Robbins, R.800-802.)

(Affidavit of Glen

In 1981, the police were called to LAHCO

191 times, while the total calls to the Salt Lake Police
Department in 1981 were 114,380.

When averaged over the total

resident and work force population of LAHCO and SLC, the number
of calls to police from LAHCO were fewer than that of SLC in
general, per capita.

(Norman Affidavit, paragraph 12 and

Exhibit 1, R.814-821.)
6.

The affidavit of Fire Chief Peter O. Pederson stated

that the unique nature of hotels and motels imposes unusual
costs on the City because they commonly are multiple-story
structures and consist of high density residential
accommodations.

(R.196-197.)

Yet the Innkeeper Tax is imposed

on all Innkeepers regardless of building height.

Of the total

number of units subject to the tax, 59% are structures of six
floors or less.

(Affidavit of Sue Wo1ley, R.803-809, at 809.)

Also, hotels in Salt Lake City account for only 11.5% of the
total floor space of high-rise buildings in Salt Lake City
(higher than 5 floors) and there are many more high-rise
- 9 -

residential apartments and condominiums than hotels.
Affidavit, paragraph 8 and Exhibit 6, R.816, 826-27.)

(Norman
Based on

population and taxes paid, LAHCO and its guests already pay for
more than a proportionate share of the costs of fire protection
without considering the Innkeeper Tax.

(Norman Affidavit,

paragraph 20, and Exhibit 7, R. 816-17, 828.)
7.

In addition to the security protection it provides for

itself, LAHCO also provides other services, such as garbage
service, street and sidewalk cleaning which normally are
performed by SLC for city residents.

LAHCO has purchased

garbage trucks costing more than $90,000, has paid more than
$14,000 per year for employees to run the trucks and haul
garbage, and has paid more than $14,000 per year in landfill
fees, plus $200 per month for operating the trucks.

(Affidavit

of Glen Robbins, R. 800-02.)
8.

SLC also opines that the Salt Lake City Airport with

its recent $80 million expansion "uniquely benefits" Innkeepers
(Affidavit of Louis Miller, R. 190.)

The ordinance at issue in

this case, however, raises taxes for the city's general fund.
The Salt Lake City Airport is run under a separate Enterprise
Fund, and no money passes from the general fund (including
revenues of the Innkeeper Tax) to the airport.

None of the $80

million airport expansion came from the SLC general funds.
(Norman Affidavit, Paragraphs 5-10, R. 812-813.)
- 10 -

LAHCO was prevented from expanding the information
contained in the Affidavit of Merrill Norman from LAHCO itself
to encompass all Innkeepers because of the trial court's
protective order ruling that any information about taxes paid
or their comparison to benefits received is not a relevant
factual issue.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A Utah city's license taxes are subject to the

statutory requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 that they be
"uniform in respect to the class upon which they are imposed"
and are also subject to the equal protection requirements of
the Utah Constitution's due process clause of Article I,
Section 7.

Prior Utah Supreme Court cases regarding the

legality of license taxes subject to these requirements
establish that the test of legality of a license tax is whether
the class subject to the tax includes all persons similarly
situated and whether the class bears a reasonable relation to
the purposes to be accomplished by the tax.

The application of

this test requires a court to consider all circumstances under
which the ordinance was enacted and would operate.
2.

Facts in the record through affidavits and discovery

created a genuine issue of material fact respecting whether
transient visitors to SLC impose greater burdens on city
- 11 -

government than city residents or whether they pay less tax to
SLC per resident equivalent than do SLC residents—the grounds
on which SLC justified singling out Innkeepers for taxation.
Despite this factual dispute, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment and ruling that the question of legality of
the classification is a matter of law to be determined without
regard to the factual circumstances, and that SLC may legally
tax Innkeepers separately, on a different basis -- and at a
much higher rate -- than other businesses, regardless of the
factual circumstances involved, merely because Innkeepers can
be described as a separate class.
3.

The district court erred in its ruling that evidence

of other taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC is irrelevant to the
issue of legality of the Innkeeper Tax, and in prohibiting
discovery of that information.

Because the Innkeeper Tax

raises general operating revenues for SLC, the test of legality
of the tax requires a consideration of whether factual
circumstances show a reasonable relation between the choice to
levy a special tax only on Innkeepers and the general revenue
needs of SLC.
4.

Although SLC characterized the Innkeeper Tax as a

"license tax", it bears no functional resemblance to typical
municipal license taxes.

Rather than being a fixed charge

assessed against someone operating a business as a precondition
- 12 -

to engaging in that particular business, it is measured by and
assessed against particular transactions between the business
and its customers—very similar in operation to a sales tax.
Like an income tax, it is periodically assessed against the
receipts or income of the business as distinguished from the
business itself, and is collected apart from business license
fees.

SLC has exhausted its power to impose sales taxes

through its imposition of other pre-existing levies; and SLC,
like all other Utah municipalities, is not lawfully empowered
to impose and collect an income tax.

ARGUMENT
I.

IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF FACTUAL
ISSUES ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SPECIAL TAX AGAINST
INNKEEPERS FOR GENERAL REVENUE PURPOSES
A.

The Innkeeper Tax is Illegally Discriminatory if it
Unreasonably Limits the Class Taxed to Innkeepers
Only. The Tax is Unreasonable if it Fails to Include
Others Similarly Situated and the Class Taxed Bears no
Reasonable Relation to Raising Revenue.
The most recent Utah case on point with the issues

raised in this case is Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979)(hereinafter
"Farmington").

In that case, this Court held that a Farmington

City license tax on "amusements," which would only apply to
Lagoon and possibly to the Oakridge Country Club, was invalid
as being in violation of the requirements and protections of
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Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-80, and the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution

provides that:
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 is the legislative grant of power to
the cities to enact license tax ordinances for the purposes of
regulating or raising revenue.

That statute requires that:

All such license fees and taxes shall be
uniform in respect to the class upon which
they are imposed.
In Farmington, the tax imposed was 2 percent of gross
revenues.

Its only purpose was to produce revenue.

In

interpreting the above constitutional and statutory provisions,
the Court noted that legislative judgment and discretion in
municipal taxation is entitled to great deference.

Yet the

Court went on as follows:
Such deference, however, does not allow
unfettered discretion. U.C.A., 1953,
10-8-80 requires that 'all such license fees
and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the
class upon which they are imposed.* Nor is
the municipal corporation at liberty to
arbitrarily define a 'class' for taxation
and then claim to tax it uniformly; such an
approach would not only totally emasculate
the effect of the uniformity provision, but
would fall wide of the constitutional
requirements of equal protection and due
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process. A valid classification, for
statutory and constitutional purposes, must
include all persons similarly situated, and
must bear a reasonable relation to the
purposes to be accomplished by the act.
Where some persons or transactions excluded
from the operation of the law are, as to its
subject matter, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, the
law is discriminatory in the sense of being
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Id., at 1245 (emphasis added).
In Farmington, this Court construed the due process
protections of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution as
having an equal protection aspect which prohibits arbitrary
classification for tax purposes.

At least this is true for

taxes which are also subject to the uniformity requirements
imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.

In applying that standard

to the Farmington amusement tax, this Court stated:

"Whenever

a class is singled out for taxation, the amount of which is
unduly burdensome, the question of abuse of taxing power is
raised. "

Id.. , at 1246.

Previous Utah cases have held ordinances to be
unconstitutional which levied taxes on one class of taxpayers
even though its members were numerous.

In Weber Basin Home

Builders' Association v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866
(1971), Roy City had imposed an increase from $12.00 to $112.00
for a building permit fee for a single family dwelling, and
argued that Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 authorized such a fee.
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In

that case, as in this one, the purpose of the ordinance was to
raise revenue for the city's general fund.

The Court

specifically stated that the fee must be analyzed as a tax.
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 217, 487 P.2d at 86.

The Court stated that

a license tax "cannot be imposed in any such manner as to
violate constitutional principles, which include equal and
nondiscriminatory treatment and protection under the law."
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 218, 487 P.2d at 86.
The test to be applied was described as follows:
The critical question here is whether the
ordinance in its practical operation results
in an unjust discrimination by imposing a
greater burden of the cost of city
government on one class of persons as
compared to another without any proper basis
for such differentiation and classification.
Id.
Orem City v. Pyne, 16 Utah 2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965),
involved a criminal complaint for failure to pay Orem's
business license tax, authority for which was claimed to be
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.

The district court had found that

tax to be unreasonable and discriminatory and had dismissed the
complaint.

This Court affirmed, referring to and adopting the

opinion of the district judge, Judge Harding.

The license tax

in that case, just as SLC has done with its license tax on
other businesses and on Innkeepers, placed some businesses on a
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flat fee basis and others on a percentage of gross revenues
basis.

A copy of Judge Harding's decision is Exhibit 6 to the

Addendum.

It states at page 4:

To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a
reasonable classification of businesses
generally for taxation and fix a tax rate
therefore based on gross sales with certain
minimum and maximum amounts, and by another
section of the same ordinance exclude from
the operation of Section 3, certain
businesses naturally falling within its
classification, and apply to such excluded
businesses a tax rate on a flat annual basis
that can not possibly be more than the
minimum for the unexcluded businesses is
unreasonable, arbitrary, and
discriminatory. Such exclusion assures to
the excluded businesses a concession not
accorded to other businesses similarly
situated.
Utah's watershed case in this field is Cache County v.
Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900), in which a county
ordinance set a license fee on those engaged in the business of
sheepherding.

The purpose of the ordinance was to raise

revenue, not to regulate the sheep industry.

Commenting that

"The law abhors inequality and lack of uniformity in taxation,
whether the burden be imposed by license or by levy and
assessment," id..,

21 Utah at 224, 61 P. at 307, this Court held

the license tax on sheepherders to be illegal.

The legislature

had not granted counties the power to levy license taxes for
revenue purposes.

Further, a tax only on sheepherders was so
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unequal and oppressive as to be prohibited by the Utah and
United States Constitutions.

On the latter issue, this Court

stated:
When it is considered that such a power of
taxation would be in the hands of but a few
men in each county, whose actions might
proceed from prejudice towards a particular
business, from favoritism or animosity, or
from other improper motives or influences,
easy of concealment and difficult of
detection, it becomes unnecessary to suggest
the injustice which might be done under the
cover of the power, because that becomes
apparent upon a moment's reflection. Under
such a power, as is contended for by counsel
for the respondent, the sheep industry, or
one particular industry, in some of the
counties of this commonwealth, might be
taxed for more than the cost of maintaining
the government, to the practical exemption
of all other kinds of business from
contributing their share of the burden.
Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily
invaded or annihilated, under the mere guise
of a license. One class of citizens cannot
thus be compelled to bear the burden of
government, to the advantage of all other
classes. The law, as we have seen, will not
permit it. Neither the constitution nor the
statute authorizes boards of county
commissioners to enact ordinances, as in
this instance, to tax the citizens
arbitrarily and unjustly by license which
confers no privilege that was not previously
enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation.
Id., 21 Utah at 227, 61 P. at 308 (emphasis added).
These Utah cases establish that the test of the
constitutionality and legality of the Innkeeper Tax at issue
here, as regards the discrimination issues, is whether the
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classification of Innkeepers as the only taxpayers includes all
persons similarly situated, and bears a reasonable relation to
the general revenue raising purposes to be accomplished by the
tax.
B.

The Issue of Reasonableness of Classification Involves
Controverted Questions of Fact.
In Farmington, supra, the amusement license tax

imposed on Lagoon was found to be unconstitutional and illegal
after a trial of the facts, which brought out evidence of the
history of Farmington's taxation of Lagoon, of the services
provided to that business by the city, of the services and
improvements Lagoon provided for itself, and of the city's
needs.

On appeal, "Farmington does not challenge the trial

court's findings of fact.

It requests that we reverse the

finding of unconstitutionality and illegality 'as a matter of
law'".

Id., at 1244.
After setting out the test for compliance with the

statutory and constitutional provisions (quoted supra at page
15), this Court stated:
The issue in the present case, then, may be
reduced to an inquiry whether or not the
licensing ordinance passed by Farmington and
assessed against Lagoon represents such an
improper classification that, its operation
becomes discriminatory, arbitrary, and an
abuse of the taxing power. Such an inquiry
must necessarily take into consideration all
circumstances under which the ordinance was
enacted and under which it would operate,
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since reasonableness of classification
cannot be determined by reference to a few
well-chosen legal generalities, and a
classification which is perfectly reasonable
in one context and may be patently
unreasonable in another.
Id., at 1245 (emphasis added).
This Court rejected Farmington City's suggestion that the
case should have been decided as a matter of law.
The holding in Farmington that the issue of reasonableness
of classification involves issues of fact is supported by other
Utah Supreme Court cases.

In Weber Basin Home Builders

Association vs. Roy City, supra, invalidating a $100.00
increase in building permit fees, this Court looked to the
facts to test the reasonableness of the classification:
Under the undisputed facts as presented to
the trial court: where the basic flat-fee
charge for a building permit was increased
in one jump from $12 to $112, which increase
admittedly had no relationship to increased
costs of the service rendered; and more
importantly, where the declared purpose was
to raise general revenue for the City, it
was his opinion that the increase placed a
disproportionate and unfair burden on new
households in Roy City, as compared to the
old ones, in the maintenance of the City
government; and that conseguently it was
discriminatory and unconstitutionally
impermissible. We are not disposed to
disagree with that conclusion.
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 219, 487 P.2d at 869.
This Court has also imposed a factual test of
reasonableness in a similar situation.
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When a City imposes

connection fees for city services or subdivision fees, the test
of the validity of these fees is one of reasonableness, whether
the fees require newly develpped properties to bear more than
their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to the
benefits conferred.

In Banberry Development Corp. v. South

Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), this Court held that
"[t]he reasonableness of the dedication or cash requirement in
a particular case was a question of fact that must be resolved
at trial."

Ld./ at 901, citing Call v. City of West Jordan,

614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
It is apparent that when Utah courts apply the state
constitution and statutory provisions regarding uniformity and
non-discrimination to a city's revenue-raising license taxes,
the issue of the reasonableness of classification is one of
fact to be decided by reference to all surrounding
circumstances.
It is appropriate as a policy matter, for the state
constitution and law to require a reasonable basis in fact for
classification, rather than asking if facts could be conceived
which would justify the classification (which is the test for
compliance with the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
When the Utah Legislature granted power to cities to raise
revenues by license taxes, it determined to protect those who
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could be taxed and expressed a policy of fairness and equality
in taxation.

This is expressed by the uniformity requirement

of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.

The equal protection elements of

the Utah Constitution also express that policy.

This Court has

recognized this policy in striking down discriminatory license
taxes in the cases cited above.

In Farmington, the city

conceived a set of facts which would justify the tax.

But

because no such facts could be shown to exist, the ordinance
failed.
These cases are in the tradition of Utah law expressing and
imposing a policy of equality and fairness in municipal
taxation, well expressed in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light &
Railway, 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914):
Uniformity and equality, so far as those
elements can be attained, are always to be
the aim and guide of those upon whom is
conferred the authority to impose or assess
taxes. When once inequality is permitted,
and it is established that the burden of
taxation may be unequally distributed under
governmental authority, the government
permitting it becomes a farce and is
entirely unworthy of either our respect or
support. So long as the burdens of taxation
are distributed equally, they cannot well
become oppressive, since they are imposed
upon those constituting the community at
large, and the community as a whole always
possesses the power to relieve itself in one
way or another. When, however, the burdens
are imposed upon only a part less than the
majority or a smaller fraction, the burden
may easily become destructive, and, if not
destructive, at least unjustly oppressive.
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Equality, therefore, becomes a safeguard
against, if not an absolute prevention of,
excessive and oppressive taxation.
Id., 45 Utah at 63, 142 P. at 1071.
Since this is an appeal of a Summary Judgment against the
Hotels, this Court will consider the record in the light most
favorable to the Hotels* position, resolving all doubts in
favor of the Hotels.

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.

Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984).
The Utah cases establish that the test for legality of
license classification is whether there exists a reasonable
basis in fact for the classification of those taxed which is
related to the purpose of the tax and whether the tax applies
to all those similarly situated.

If this test is not met, the

license tax is arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore
illegal and unconstitutional.

What factual circumstances could

provide a reasonable basis for levying a tax on Innkeepers
only?

SLC understood this issue.

It introduced affidavits

stating opinions that Innkeepers place unusual burdens on the
city, that they do not pay enough in taxes to cover the cost of
city services and the benefits provided them.

With regard to

classifying Innkeepers as the only taxpaying entities, however,
Hotels submit that no other ground could exist which could have
a reasonable relation to the object of raising revenue.
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There is, at the very least, a factual question as to
whether such conditions exist.

The analyses performed by

Merrill Norman, LAHCO's expert accountant, show that Innkeepers
and their guests pay more than their fair share of the cost of
city government even without paying the Innkeeper Tax.

The

taxes paid for each resident-equivalent of LAHCO guests amount
to $317.00 compared to the $130.00 paid by residents.

That is

without including the additional burden imposed by the
Innkeeper Tax in the amount of $139 per resident equivalent per
year.

In addition, LAHCO and its guests draw on city services

less than residents, while paying for a security force,
providing garbage collection services, and street and sidewalk
cleaning and maintenance, at a substantial cost.

There are

clearly issues of fact as to whether circumstances exist which
might justify the imposition of a revenue-raising tax only on
Innkeepers.

The city's conclusory opinion evidence was not

sufficient to preclude an investigation into these factual
questions, in view of the significant countervailing evidence
presented by the affidavits filed by LAHCO.
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II.

THE PROTECTIVE ORDER PREVENTING DISCOVERY OF TAXES PAID
BY INNKEEPERS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE
INFORMATION SOUGHT WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF THE
REASONABLENESS OF TAXING ONLY INNKEEPERS.
LAHCO sought by subpoena to obtain information about taxes

paid by other Innkeepers to Salt Lake City.

This included a

subpoena to Utah Power & Light ("UP&L") for information
regarding utility franchise taxes paid by Innkeepers.
(Addendum, Exhibit 3)

The trial court granted a protective

order prohibiting LAHCO from obtaining such information, and
issued its Order Clarifying Summary Judgment and Granting
Protective Order, which stated that the issues remaining for
determination do not include any comparison of taxes paid to
benefits received.

Under the test for reasonableness adopted

by this Court in other cases, one issue is whether the class
subject to the tax is similarly situated to those not taxed
with regard to the purposes of the ordinance.

The other issue

is whether the class subject to the tax is related to the
purpose of the ordinance.

LAHCO submits that with regard to a

revenue-raising tax, these issues really become one:

Does the

choice to tax only Innkeepers have a reasonable relation under
the actual circumstances to the revenue-raising object of the
ordinance?

If there is a reasonable basis for taxing only

Innkeepers for raising revenues, the ordinance would be valid.
If there is no such reasonable basis, the ordinance is invalid.
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One reason which might justify taxing only Innkeepers would
be if they and their guests didn't already pay their fair share
of taxes to SLC.

Since other taxes paid for general revenue

purposes are one of the circumstances in which the Innkeeper
Tax would operate, the amount of taxes paid by the Innkeepers
to SLC is relevant to determining whether, under the
circumstances, the choice of taxing only Innkeepers is
reasonably related to the revenue producing objective of the
ordinance.

This is why LAHCO and Hotel Utah believe that it

was error for the district court to grant a protective order
and to rule that such information is irrelevant.
A court will overturn a trial court's protective order upon
a showing of abuse of discretion.
996 (Colo. App. 1971).

Bigler v. Bigler, 482 P.2d

The trial court's Protective Order in

this case was based on a finding of irrelevancy.

As this Court

has held on prior occasions, "[i]n considering what is the
'subject-matter* of a lawsuit we keep in mind that the ultimate
objective of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute
between the parties; . . . Whatever helps attain that objective
is 'relevant' to the lawsuit" within the meaning of Rule 26,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d

189, 191, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967).

Because factual issues about

the reasonableness of taxing only Innkeepers exist, the amount
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of taxes paid by Innkeepers is relevant and discoverable, and
it was an abuse of discretion to hold that data respecting
other taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC are irrelevant.

III. CASES UPHOLDING TOURIST PROMOTION TAXES ON INNKEEPERS AND
TAXES ON UTILITIES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE.
This court has previously upheld the imposition by Salt
Lake County of a transient room tax on Innkeepers.

See Menlove

v. Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227 (1966)
(hereinafter "Menlove").

However, Menlove and the tax upheld

therein are readily distinguishable from this case.
First, the tax was expressly authorized by statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 17-31-1, et_ seq. (1987).

The proceeds of the

transient room tax reviewed in Menlove were required to be used
only for the purposes of establishing, financing and promoting
recreational, tourist and convention bureaus.
that fact.

This Court noted

Id., 18 Utah 2d at 205, 418 P.2d at 228.

The class

taxed by each enactment may be the same, but the tax imposed is
very much different.

For one thing, proceeds of SLC's

Innkeeper Tax are not designated for a special purpose, but are
used for the City's general fund.

This distinction is crucial.

Part of the plaintiffs argument in Menlove was that the
ordinance is invalid because the tax is levied only on a
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particular group for the benefit of all businesses generally«
This court stated that this argument
is well answered in New York Rapid Transit
Corporation v. City of New York. The City
of New York levied an excise tax on every
utility doing business in the city. The law
specified that all revenues from the tax
should be used solely and exclusively for
the purpose of relieving the people of the
city from the hardship and suffering caused
by unemployment. The local law . . . was
assailed under the U.S. Constitution as
violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the 14th amendment.
Id., 18 Utah 2d at 207, 418 Po2d at 229.
This Court in Menlove then included a protracted quote from
New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York, 3 03
U.S. 573 (1937) (hereinafter "New York Rapid Transit).

This

Court made no specific statement with regard to the application
of the quoted provisions of New York Rapid Transit to the facts
in Menlove.
But an examination of New York Rapid Transit discloses only
one applicable basis for the Menlove Court's reliance on it,
and that relates to the use of the tax money.

In New York

Rapid Transit, the ordinance was challenged on equal protection
grounds.

The first section of Mr. Justice Reed's opinion is

devoted to showing that the classification of utilities for the
purpose of applying a special tax only to utilities is
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unassailable on equal protection grounds because of the unique
characteristics of utilities.

The heart of this section is as

follows:
Since the carriers or other utilities with
the right of eminent domain, the use of
public property, special franchises or
public contracts, have many points of
distinction from other business, including
relative freedom from competition,
especially significant with increasing
density of population and municipal
expansion, these public service
organizations have no valid ground by virtue
of the equal protection clause to object to
separate treatment related to such
distinctions.
Id., at 579.
Then, in Section III, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
Rapid Transit Corporation's assertion that the city could not
adopt a tax statute for the purpose of relieving the burdens of
unemployment which put the entire burden of the tax on one
particular class of business.
this section III.

The section quoted in Menlove is

The Court agreed that a classification must

have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation (Jd. , at 584) and stated that
The 'object1 as used in the rule and cases
referred to by the corporation is the object
of the taxpaying provisions, i.e., the
raising of the money. If the designation of
the utilities as the only taxpayers under
the legislation in question does not deny to
them the equal protection of the laws, the
fact that an appropriation of the funds for
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relief is a part of the legislation is not
significant.
Id., at 585.
The use of tax funds is irrelevant when the classification of
those paying taxes is based upon a difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the revenue-raising object of the tax.
"There need be no relation between the class of taxpayers and
the purpose of the appropriation."

Id..,

at 585.

Does the reasoning used by the Court in New York Rapid
Transit apply to Innkeepers?

New York Rapid Transit is based

first on the premise that utilities may be specially taxed,
even for general revenues, without violating equal protection
principles.

In Menlove, the Utah Supreme Court doesn't discuss

whether Innkeepers are subject to special taxes for general
revenue purposes.

That is the question in this case.

But

Innkeepers are very much like every other business that
operates in the city, and in striking contrast to public
utilities.

Hotels and motels are not granted monopolies and

public franchises, or the right of emminent domain.

There is

nothing in Menlove to suggest that Innkeepers, like public
utilities, may always be separately classified and taxed for
general revenues, because of the nature of their business.
In fact, this Court has specifically stated that utilities
may be subject to special taxes, but only to the extent of
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their monopoly.

In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.

vs. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah 1979), a case
involving a tax question, this Court stated:
At the time this Court decided Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Ogden City,
utility companies had no competition and
therefore could be treated as a distinct
class. To the limited extent that
competition in the area of manufacture and
sale of telephones is now permitted,
plaintiff is not a 'distinct class1 and
cannot be treated differently from other
manufacturers or suppliers of equipment.
The opinion in Menlove makes no investigation of whether
there is a reasonable relation between the classification of
Innkeepers and the object of raising revenues, as the U.S.
Supreme Court did in New York Rapid Transit.

In the absence

any discussion justifying special treatment of Innkeepers or
equating Innkeepers with public utilities, it would be a gros
distortion of New York Rapid Transit to say it supports a tax
on Innkeepers regardless of the use of the tax.
In fact, portions of New York Rapid Transit which were
quoted in Menlove continue and provided a clearly apropriate
basis for upholding the tax in Menlove.

After holding that

"there need be no relation between the class of taxpayers and
the purpose of the appropriation" (New York Rapid Transit at
585), the Court goes on to state as follows:
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In some cases, the classification of
taxpayers may be upheld as having a fair and
substantial relation to a constitutional
non-fiscal object [cites], but it is not
constitutionally necessary that the
classification be related to the
appropriation. Jj3. , at 587.
A reasonable relation between the entities taxed and the use of
funds raised is a sufficient, but not a necessary ground for
upholding a tax against the claim of violation of the 14th
Amendment equal protection guarantees.

This indicates a two-step inquiry to determine whether a
particular statute violates equal protection: First, look at
the taxpayers singled out under the taxing statute.

Is the

inclusion of only those taxpayers in the class being taxed
rationally related to the purpose of gathering revenue?

This

is a question of whether there is something economically unique
about the class being taxed which is rationally related to the
revenue-producing purpose.

If there is no reason as a general

matter to treat the class being taxed separately and uniquely,
then the second question is, does the particular use of the
revenues produced by the tax have some rational relation to the
class of taxpayers being taxed?

In New York Rapid Transit, the

answer to the first question was "yes," and since utilities may
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be subject to special taxes, there was no need to address the
second question.
Applying this test to Menlove, the answer to the first
question is "no"—there is nothing unique about Innkeepers as a
general matter (especially in the absence of any evidence)
which would justify taxing them separately.

This would require

that the second question be asked and answered to determine
constitutionality.

And in Menlove the answer to the second

question is "yes"—there is a rational relation between
Innkeepers, whose businesses derive in large part from
tourists, and the use of funds to promote tourism.

Although

Menlove does not describe its application of the language
quoted from New York Rapid Transit, an application of that test
shows that New York Rapid Transit supports the Menlove decision
only if the Menlove court was justifying the transient room tax
because of the relation of the Innkeepers being taxed to the
use of the tax money to promote recreation and tourism.
This analysis of Menlove is bolstered by the fact that it
did not address any of the previous Utah cases which indicate
that there must be some justification for singling out a
particular business as a source for raising revenue.

See

Farmington, supra, Orem City v. Pyne, supra; Weber Basin Home
Builders v. Roy City, supra,
supra.

and discussion at pages 14-19,

These cases make strong statements in favor of equality
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and fairness in taxation.

Menlove should not be read other

than to hold that there must be a reasonable basis for
burdening one particular business or industry with a
disproportionate amount of the costs of government.
Other states1 courts, when confronted with a tax similar to
the one at issue in Menlove, have upheld the tax because of a
rational relation between Innkeepers and the promotion of
tourism.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals has overturned a local

revenue tax on Innkeepers even though a prior Kentucky case had
held a tax on Innkeepers for tourist promotion to be valid.

In

City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971) a 5% license tax was imposed on hotels and
motels.

The Kentucky Constitution, like the Utah Statute

involved in this case, contains a requirement that taxes "shall
be uniform."

:ic*- / at 256. The court noted that a legislature

may discriminate between classes in the imposition of license
taxes, but that discrimination which does not have a reasonable
basis is obviously arbitrary and violates the principle of
equality and uniformity set forth in the Kentucky
Constitution.

Id.. , at 257. The court further stated as

follows:
Running through the foregoing cases (finding
classification unreasonable) is the
principle that a legislative body may not,
without some rational basis, select a
certain type of business enterprise and
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impose upon it a substantially heavier tax
than that imposed upon other businesses
which fall within the same general
classification. Id., at 257. (emphasis
added)
The Kentucky Court could find no reasonable basis which would
justify the tax in that case, although the city contended that
extra services might be required by hotels.

In that case, the

City imposing the tax relied on a prior case upholding a
transient room tax upon Innkeepers, for the purpose of
financing the activities of tourist and convention
commissions.

The court said

The principal ground upon which we sustained
the classification was that the limited
purpose of the tax accorded this particular
tax payer a special benefit from the
utilization of the revenue realized. No
such distinguishing feature appears here.
Id., at 259.
See also Dicks v. Naff, 500 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Ark. 1973).
An examination of the Menlove case and the New York Rapid
Transit case on which it relied shows that those cases provide
no support for SLC's position here for the reason that the tax
in Menlove was upheld because of the rational relation of the
transient room tax to the use of the funds for promoting
convention, recreation, and tourist bureaus.

Menlove is also

distinguishable because it involved a question of
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constitutionality under the 14th Amendment only, while the
present case also raises issues under the Utah Constitution and
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.

IV. THE INNKEEPER TAX IS AN ILLEGAL SALES OR INCOME TAX.

At a level even more basic than the question of whether
Innkeeper Tax is addressed to a legally or constitutionally
inappropriate class, this tax also fails for the reason that it
operates as a kind of tax that lies beyond the power of Utah
municipalities to impose.

Although SLC characterized the

Innkeeper Tax as a "license tax", it bears no functional
resemblance to typical municipal license taxes.

Rather than

being a fixed charge assessed against someone operating a
business as a precondition to engaging in that particular
business, it is measured by and assessed against particular
transactions between the business and its customers—very
similar in operation to a sales tax.

Like an income tax, it is

periodically assessed against the receipts or income of the
business as distinguished from the business itself.
In 1982, SLC had already exhausted its power to impose
sales taxes through its imposition of other pre-existing sales
tax levies.

Further, SLC—like all other Utah

municipalities—is not lawfully empowered to impose and collect
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an income tax.

Existing transient room taxes imposed by Salt

Lake County pursuant to its express authority under Utah Code
Ann. § 17-31-2 (1987), now codified at § 59-12-301 (Supp.
1987).argue against any inference that the power to collect
such a tax may be imputed to SLC in the absence of express
legislation.
A.

Measured by its Incidents, the Innkeeper Tax is an
Unlawful Sales Tax, Not a License Tax.

In Utah and elsewhere, municipalities possess only the
taxing powers that they have clearly and expressly been
invested with by act of the state legislature.

See e.g.,

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ogden City, 2 6
Utah 2d 190, 192, 487 P.2d 849, 850 (1971); Pacific First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce City, 27 Wash. 2d 347,
178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947).

To meet the challenge that a

municipal tax ordinance is beyond the city's delegated powers,
the city must demonstrate that state law expressly authorizes
such taxes without ambiguity:
[0]nly a legislative act plainly and
unmistakably delegating the specific power
of taxation claimed will be recognized as
conferring the power upon a local government
entity . . . [A]11 doubts and ambiguities
will be resolved against the existence of
the power.
2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 21.01 (1982).

When

previously called upon to determine the extent of a city's
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power to collect a specific municipal tax, this Court has given
repeated expression to the principle that "statutes imposing
taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority."

Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne,

22 Utah 2d 172, 175, 450 P.2d 97, 99 (1969); W.F. Jensen Candy
Company v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 365, 61 P.2d 629,
632 (1936).

In somewhat different context, the United States

Supreme Court has similarly found it to be "elementary" that
taxing measures "are to be interpreted liberally in favor of
taxpayers and that words defining things to be taxed may not be
extended beyond their clear import.

Doubts must be resolved

against the Government and in favor of taxpayers."

Miller v.

Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508 (1931)(citations
omitted)(contruing federal law).
The Utah Legislature has delegated to municipalities the
power to "raise revenue by levying and collecting a license fee
or tax on any business within the limits of the city."
Code Ann. § 10-8-80 (1986).

Utah

Yet a tax cannot be instantly

legitimized regardless of its form by the simple device of
labelling it a "license tax".

As Justice Brandeis has

explained for the Court in Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 292 (1920), "the name by which the
tax is described in the statute is, of course, immaterial."
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Remembering that "statutes granting authority to
municipalities to impose an occupation or privilege tax must be
strictly construed," Coos Bay v. Aerie No. 58, Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 179 Or. 83, 170 P.2d 389, 399 (1946), courts instead
must independently determine the true nature of a tax from its
incidents.

See e.g., P. Lorillard Co. v. Seattle, 83 Wash. 2d

586, 521 P.2d 208, 210 (1974); Eugene Theatre Co. v. Eugene,
194 Or. 603, 243 P.2d 1060, 1074 (1952); Ingels v. Ley, 5 Cal.
2d 154, 53 P.2d 939, 942 (1936); Independent School Dist.,
Cassia County v. Pfost, 51 Idaho 240, 4 P.2d 893, 895 (1931).
In determining whether a municipal tax is an authorized tax,
rules of statutory construction dictate that, "where there is
doubt as to whether a tax comes within such statutory
designation, the doubt is to be resolved against the tax."
Shulick-Taylor Co. v. Wheeling, 43 S.E.2d 54, 56 (W. Va.
1947).

See Eugene Theatre Co. v. City of Eugene, 243 P.2d at

1072.
The tests to be employed to determine the true nature of a
tax, as opposed to its characterization, have been variously
described.

The court in P. Lorrillard Co. v. Seattle, 83 Wash.

586, 521 P.2d 208 (1974), summarized the tests employed by
courts in this manner:
It has been said that the incidence of a tax
embraces the subject matter and the measure
that is the base or yardstick by which the
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tax is applied. Other cases suggest that
the guideline is the "true operation and
effect of the law . . . on the basis of the
practical results which follow its
operation," or its "incidents, and . . . the
natural and legal effect of the language
employed in the statute,"
Id., 521 P.2d at 210 (citations omitted).

Employing these

standards in this case it is manifest that the so-called
license tax imposed by SLC is in its legal effect, in its
incident, and in reality, a sales tax promulgated and imposed
in excess of the city's statutory authority.

It is a license

tax in name only.
Municipalities impose a license tax only if that tax
possesses those attributes commonly associated with license or
occupation taxes:

"A license tax strictly speaking is a tax

that must be paid by the party or dealer as a condition
precedent to legally engaging in business and is usually
incident to regulation under the police powers of the state."
New Orleans v. Christian, 87 So.2d 6, 7 (La. 1956); Eugene
Theatre Co. v. Eugene, 243 P.2d at 1074; Independent School
Dist., Cassia County v. Pfost, 4 P.2d at 896; Cache County v.
Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 218, 61 P. 303, 305 (1900) ("A mere tax
imposed upon a business or occupation . . .

is not a license,

unless the levy confers a right or privilege as to the business
which would not otherwise exist").

Similarly, an occupation

tax is a tax on "the owners of businesses for the privilege of
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conducting various classes of business within the boundaries of
the city.H

Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc./ 548 P.2d 1276,

1277 (Colo. 1976).
A license or occupation tax is further characterized by the
fact that:
This tax is generally measured by a flat
rate or by such bases as capital stock,
capital surplus, number of units or
capacity. Usually excluded are taxes
measured directly by transactions, gross or
net income, or value or property except to
those to which only nominal rates apply.
Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 260 (Ky.
App. 1971)(Osborne, J., concurring).

M

[W]here a tax has all of

the attributes of either a sales tax or an income tax and no
real earmarks of the ancient license tax, it cannot be
reasonably called a license tax.

To do so only confuses the

law and confounds those who must operate under it." Id. at 264.
The Innkeeper Tax possesses none of the attributes of a
license tax.

Hotel operators have long been subject to

licensing requirements under section 15-13-1 of Salt Lake
City's Ordinances.

The so-called license tax imposed by the

Innkeeper Tax ordinance neither replaces those prior license
requirements, nor confers any new privilege on licensees.
Further, this license tax does not operate as a condition
precedent to engaging in the operation of a hotel or motel.
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Instead, it levies a quarterly fee, assessed after the fact,
against particular transactions between the businesses and
their customers.
Perhaps the most striking attribute of the Innkeeper Tax
which marks it as a sales tax rather than a license tax is the
fact that the tax is levied not as a fixed fee but as a
percentage of certain gross receipts of hotels and motels in
the same fashion as a sales tax.

Courts in a number of

jurisdictions have held so-called license taxes, similar to the
present tax in their legal effect and incidents, to be sales
taxes.

In Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., Inc., 143 S.E.2d 416

(Ga. App. 1965), the court held that a "license tax" of 2<fc on
each pack of cigarettes sold was in actuality a sales tax.

The

Court noted:
It is thus clear that the tax imposed by
this ordinance is not a fixed license or
occupation tax imposed upon one for the
privilege of engaging in a business or
occupation but is a sales and use tax
imposed pon the individual transactions of
selling, storing, or delivering cigarettes.
Id. at 418.

See also Birdsong Motors, Inc. v. Tampa, 235 So.2d

318, 319 (Fla. App. 1970) (a license tax based on gross sales
imposed on retail merchants was in fact a sales tax); Suzy's
Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Kansas City, 580 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1979) (a
license tax of 1% of the gross receipts of cafes was in fact a
sales tax).
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The Supreme Court of Alaska recently held a so-called
license tax imposed upon hotel and motel rentals assessed as a
percentage of the gross receipts of those businesses to be in
fact a sales tax.
(Alaska, 1982),

City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396

The tax imposed by the city in Gangl was very

similar to the Innkeeper Tax.

In concluding that the hotel tax

levied by the City of Homer was in fact a sales tax, the Alaska
Supreme Court noted that:
One of the hallmarks of a sales tax is that
it taxes the actual transaction involved;
i.e., it is not until the sale, rental, or
provision of services takes place that the
tax is imposed. This distinguishes a sales
tax from a license or privilege tax, which
is a sum exacted for the privilege of
carrying on an occupation in general, rather
than any particular exercise of this
privilege.
Id. at 7 (citing 2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law
§ 21.80).
The tax at issue in the present case does not replace prior
licenses and taxes imposed on hotels and motels in Salt Lake
City.

SLC continues to require that hotels be licensed

pursuant to section 15-13-1 of its Ordinances.

This new

ordinance provides only that fees paid under license tax
ordinances shall be credited against fees due under this
ordinance.

SLC thus attempts to impose dual licensing

requirements on plaintiffs.

In the context of non-profit
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social clubs, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Utah
statutes allow a city to license and regulate business
enterprises, "but it may do so only once."

Salt Lake City v.

Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 421, 424 P.2d 442,
445 (1967).
It is plainly apparent that the Innkeeper Tax is a license
tax in name only.

Just as with a sales tax, it is imposed

against certain transactions and gross receipts of businesses
and, rather than being a flat fee as is common for license
taxes, it varies depending on the revenues generated by those
businesses.

It does not supercede prior licensing ordinances

of SLC because in reality the tax imposed by the ordinance is a
sales tax.
Utah law allows cities to impose a sales tax of as much as
1%.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204 (Supp. 1987).

Salt Lake City

currently imposes that maximum allowable sales tax.

As to

plaintiffs, then, Salt Lake City by adopting this so-called
license tax has in effect unlawfully more than doubled the
municipal sales tax burden imposed on plaintiffs.

By thinly

disguising what is really a sales tax through the device of
calling the imposition a license tax, Salt Lake City has
attempted to evade the limitation on municipal sales taxes
established by the Utah Legislature.
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B.

The Ordinance Creates an Impermissible Income Tax

Like an income tax, the Innkeepers Tax is imposed directly
on the revenues of the business rather than on the operator of
the business, as would be expected of a license tax.
Eugene Theatre Co. v. Eugene, 243 P.2d at 1071.

See

Like an income

tax, the revenue produced by the Salt Lake City tax fluctuates
with the income of the taxpayer.

The fact that this tax may be

assessed only against some of the sources of income of the
businesses taxed is irrelevant for the purposes of
characterizing the tax as an income tax.

While Davis v. Ogden

City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616 (1950), comments that

"la]n

occupation tax does not become an income tax because the amount
levied is based upon gross income," (215 P.2d at 624), that
case involved an ordinance requiring that "any person who
engages in business" in Ogden "must obtain a 'Business
License,*" the fee for which was graduated according to gross
receipts of the business—i.e., a bona fide business license
ordinance.

The SLC Innkeepr Tax ordinance requires no license,

it simply assesses a tax computed upon the income of a
particular class of business—a discrimination considered
unnacceptable by the Davis court.
P.2d at 621-22.
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Id., 117 Utah at 326-27, 215

More recent cases from courts considering the question have
abandoned such artificial distinctions.

The Colorado Supreme

Court has noted, in finding a so-called license tax to be in
reality an income tax, "that gross income and net income taxes
are both 'income taxes' and that 'their difference is a matter
of degree.'"

Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc., 548 P.2d

1276, 1278 (Colo. 1976).
In concluding that a 2% fee levied against the gross
revenues of construction and building materials businesses was
an income tax, the court in Minturn reasoned:
The clear inference is that an income tax,
whether net or gross, bears a direct
relation to the income or receipts of a
business. An occupation tax bears no such
relationship. The latter is a tax upon the
very privilege of doing business, and does
not fluctuate from month to month depending
upon the financial success or sales of the
enterprise.
Id. at 1278.

This conclusion was subsequently reaffirmed by

the Colorado court in Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Colorado Springs, 572 P.2d 834, 835 (Colo. 1977), which held
that a municipal tax of 3% of utilities' gross revenues "not a
tax on the privilege of doing business, but rather is an income
tax."

To maintain that this tax is a license tax which SLC is

authorized to impose exalts form over substance by ignoring the
actual effect of the tax.
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C. Specific Legislative Treatment of Transient Room Tax
Issues Defeats Any Inference of Municipal Power to Tax.
Any inference that SLC has been granted the power to impose
the Innkeeper Tax by the general language of statutes such as
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 is dispelled uipon further
consideration of other Utah statutes specifically addressing
the transient room tax issue.

Where the Utah Legislature has

perceived a purpose that may properly be served by imposition
of a local transient room tax upon Innkeepers, it has expressly
granted the power to do so.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-301 (Supp.

1987) unequivocally grants to county commisioners the power to
"raise revenue by the imposition of a transient room tax."
This tax may not exceed

3% of the rent for every occupancy of a
suite, room, or rooms on all persons,
companies, corporations, or other like and
similar persons, groups, or organizations
doing business as motor courts, motels,
hotels, inns, or like and similar public
accommodations.
Plainly, this statute authorizes a tax like the Innkeeper Tax,
but does so only as to county governments.

The statute further

limits expenditure of revenues thus raised to specific
visitor-related projects.

See Utah Code Ann. § 17-31-1 through

-6 (1987)(Addendum, Exhibit 7 ) .
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In field where the Legislature has made a deliberate,
carefully drawn delegation of power, SLC now asserts a much
broader authority, one wholly implied from the language oif
general licensing statutes.

Logically, the inference to be

drawn runs in the opposite direction: where the legislature has
so carefully designated how and by whom a transient room tax
may be imposed, the omission of others from that grant should
be understood as an exclusion.

See 2A Sutherland on Statutory

Construction § 47.23 (4th ed. Sands 1973).

A classix maxim of

statutory construction reads in substance: "That which is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied."

See Id. at

123 n.l; cf. Munro v. City of Albuquerque, 48 N.M. 306, 150
P.2d 733, 743 (1943)("Expressum facit cessare taciturn").
The argument of authority by implication also runs afoul of
the Legislature's treatment of transient room taxation issues
with reference to cities.

Rather than authorizing a tax like

that imposed by counties, the Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax
Act provides:

[A] city or town in which the transient room
capacity equals or exceeds the permanent
census population may impose a sales tax of
up to 1%. . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(8)(a)(Supp. 1987)(emphasis added).
Thus, where concern has arisen regarding an influx of visitors
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as guests of Innkeepers within a city, the act establishes a
specific revenue-raising mechanism for enhancing the city's
general fund.

This grant of authority gives not even a hint of

legislative intent that cities and towns may now impose a
transient room tax like that used by counties, but without the
accompanying limits on use.
Remembering that "[c]ities are creatures of the legislature
and can exercise no power except that granted," Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden City, 26 Utah 2d 190, 192, 487 P.2d
849, 850 (1971), a power to impose the Innkeeper Tax cannot now
be conferred upon SLC by mere inference.

CONCLUSION
Because the trial court's award of summary judgment to SLC
was in error, and because the trial court's protective order
prohibiting discovery of taxes paid by Innkeepers to Salt Lake
City was an abuse of discretion, appellant Hotels respectfully
request that the summary judgment granted by the trial court on
the issues of the legality of the classification of Innkeepers
as the only class subject to the Innkeeper Tax be vacated and
this case remanded to the trial court for a trial on these
issues.

Further, because it was an abuse of discretion to
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prohibit discovery of the taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC,
appellant Hotels request that the trial court's protective
order prohibiting discovery of such information be vacated and
that the trial court be instructed upon remand to allow
discovery of relevant facutal information.
Should this Court determine the Innkeeper Tax to be an
unlawful sales or income tax, the district court's judgment
should be reversed, and judgment should be entered in favor of
the Hotels.

DATED

December

22-

1987.

RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird

By:
Attorneys for Little America
Hotel Corporation
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Dorothy C. Pleshe
Russell C. Kearl

By:

^^^UL-^-^o^2Attorneys for Utah Hotel
Company

CDN0712K

- 50 -

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION AND UTAH HOTEL COMPANY were mailed, postage fully
prepaid, this

day of December, 1987, to the following:

Roger F. Cutler, Esq,
Salt Lake City Attorney
324 South State Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CDN0712K
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******************************************

ADDENDUM
**************************************************************

SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No.
40
of 1982
"(Innkeeper License Taxes)

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 3 OF TITLE 20 OF THE REVISED
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1965, BY ADDING A NEW SECTION
15 RELATING TO INNKEEPER LICENSE TAX.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1.

That Chapter 3 of Title 20 of the Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, be, and the same hereby is
amended by ADDING a new Section 15 thereto to read as follows:
Sec. 20-3-15.

Innkeeper license tax.

(1) There is hereby levied upon the business of every
person, company, corporation, or other like and similar persons,
groups or organizations, doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah,
as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like and similar public
accommodations, an annual license tax equal to one percent (1%)
of the gross revenue derived from the rent for each and every
occupancy of a suite, room or rooms, for a period of less than
thirty (30) days.
(2) For purposes of this section, gross receipts shall be
computed upon the base room rental rate.

There shall be excluded

from the gross revenue, by which this tax is measured:
(a)

The amount of any sales or use tax imposed by the

State of Utah or by any other governmental agency upon a
retailer or consumer;

onooo

(b)

The amount of any transcient room tax levied under

authority of Chapter 31 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended;
(c)

Receipts from the sale or service charge for any

food, beverage or room service charges in conjunction with
the occupancy of the suite, room or rooms, not included In
the base room rate; and
(d)

Charges made for supplying telephone service, gas

or electrical energy service, not included in the base room
rate.
(3) Any person or business entity subject to the payment of
taxes provided under subsection (1) of this section, shall be
entitled to credit against the amount of taxes due thereunder,
the amount of license taxes due the City under Sections 20-3-2
and 20-15-3 of these ordinances.
(4) The tax imposed by this section shall be due and payable to the City Treasurer quarterly on or before the thirtieth
day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period,
the first of such quarterly periods being the period commencing
with the first day of July, 1982.

Every person or business taxed

hereunder shall on or before the thirtieth day of the month next
succeeding each calendar quarterly period, file with the License
Division a report of its gross revenue for the preceding
quarterly period.

The report shall be accompanied by a remit-

tance of the amount of tax due for the period covered by the
-2-

r^nrmCMT.

report.
The City may contract with the state tax commission to
perform all functions incident to the administration and operation of this ordinance.
SECTION 2.
1982.

This ordinance shall become effective July 1,

No tax shall be due or accrue under-this enactment prior

to such effective date.
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah,
this

8th

J

day of

""e

, 1982.

^ ( w m ^ ^
CHAIRMAN
ATTEST:

(9W/A*rn-/?1V^-JL
(7SL^
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t o Mayor on

Mayor's A c t i o n :

June

15>

June 15, 1982
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MAYOR
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SHERD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for
Summary Judgment between the various plaintiffs and the defendants
Also before the Court are cross Motions to Strike all or portions
of affidavits filed by the respective parties in support of or
in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment.

This matter

was extensively briefed and argued by the parties1 respective
counsel.

Following argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement and has now considered further the oral arguments
made by counsel for the respective parties, the exhaustive
Memoranda submitted by all parties, reviewed the cases cited by
the parties, and has conducted further independent research on
the questions and issues raised.

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court is now fully advised on the issues, and therefore
enters the following Memorandum Decision.
The Court declines to deal individually or in depth with
the multitude of legal issues raised by the various parties,
inasmuch as the legal Memoranda of the respective parties
accomplish that task in an extremely adequate fashion, and to
restate those legal arguments here would only tend to unduly
lengthen this Memorandum Decision.
With regard to some of the issues raised by the parties,
the Court is satisfied that the application of proper law and
proper legal analysis allows this Court to make disposition
of those issues as a matter of law.

Other issues, however,

necessarily encompass disputed material issues of fact that
under the rules applicable to motions for summary judgment,
prohibit determination as a matter of law, and require full
resolution of those contested issues of fact by a trier of fact.
The Court is of the opinion that the affidavits to which
objections have been raised, should be allowed, for purposes
of these Motions, at least for determination as to the weight
to be given to the statements offered by the various affiants.
The Court is mindful of the potential foundational difficulties
that exist in some or all of the affidavits, and has considered
those potential foundational problems in determining the weight

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

to be given to the respective affidavits.

The cross Motions

to Strike affidavits (referred to by the defendant as "Objections")
are denied.

The Court has considered the affidavits in light of

the above standards and even giving the appropriate weight to
the affidavits, the affidavits lead this Court to the inescapable
conclusion that a portion of the issues raised in the respective
Motions for Summary Judgment contain material questions of fact
prohibiting disposition of this case as a matter of law.
The Court concludes, based upon the undisputed facts or
upon those facts where no "substantial" disputed facts exist,
and upon application of the legal authorities urged by the
defendants, which the Court accepts as proper and appropriate
under the circumstances of this case, that Summary Judgment in
part as suggested above, is appropriate.

The Court finds in

favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all legal
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions, together with those
suggested in the supporting Memoranda, with the exception of the
issue of "classification" and whether or not such a classification
is arbitrary and/or discriminatory.

A determination of the issue

of the reasonableness of the classification under the circumstances of this case must be based on the facts as they may
eventually be found by a trier of fact.

The affidavits,

considered in the light set out above, make clear that contested
issues of fact remain for ultimate resolution at trial on the
classification issue.

00031S
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

The legal authorities and positions urged by the plaintiffs
regarding the validity of the defendant Salt Lake City's ordinance
other than the "classification" issue are not, in the Court's
judgment well taken or are otherwise not applicable in this case.
While the plaintiffs attempt to raise fact

questions in

some limited areas in their Reply Memorandum, for example:
interference with interstate commerce, there exists no "genuine
issue of material fact" so as to prohibit Summary Judgment on
those issues.
Accordingly, the Motions of the respective plaintiffs for
Summary Judgment are denied.

The Motion for Summary Judgment

of the defendants is granted in part and denied in part in
conformance with this Memorandum Decision.
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare an Order
reflecting the foregoing, and submit the same, to the Court for
review and signature pursuant to Rule 2.9/$£ the Rules of
Practice for the District Courts of the/State of Utah.
Dated this

^&

day of No^^beV\ 198/.

rmnQi p
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

QO

day of November, 1983:

Lon Rodney Kump
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent M. Winterholler
James M. Elegante
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson
Enterprises, Boyer-Gardner Hotel
Properties, Tri-Arc Hotel Associates,
and Holiday Inns, Inc.
185 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Dorothy C. Pleshe
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah
Hotel Company
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Roger F. Cutler
Attorney for Defendants
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*i ' - -

S A i "

Lon Rodney Kump
State Bar Number 1862
David J. Bird
State Bar Number 0334
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-8987
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

|5 S

Plaintiff,

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

v..
Civil No. C82-5220
On «

SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
JUDGE HANSON
Defendants,
THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO:

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

WE COMMAND YOU, that all singular business and excused
being laid aside you appear on August 15, 1985 at 10:00 a.m.*
at the offices of Richards, Bird & Kump, 333 East Fourth South,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, and that at that time you produ

and allow for inspection by plaintiff, an accurate summary
your records of the total Utility Franchise Taxes paid by t.
businesses identified on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporate
herein by reference. Please provide only the total utility franchise
taxes paid for the entire group of hotels or motels identifiec
on Exhibit "A" for each of the two fiscal years, July 1, 1981

001090

2
to June 30, 1983 (Fiscal 1983), and July 1, 1983 to June 30,
1984 (Fiscal 1984).
customer.

Please provide no data specific to any one

At the time and place described above, you will be

deposed before a certified shorthand reporter concerning the
records you are required to produce.

Rather than attend the

deposition and bring the records, you may, prior to the date
set for your deposition, produce the records requested and provide
plaintiff or its authorized representative adequately verified
copies of such records.
plaintiff's attorney.

To do so, please make arrangements with
Please be advised that plaintiff agrees

to pay you the reasonable cost of production of these documents.
Please make prior arrangements regarding calculation of such
charges with plaintiff's attorney.
Disobedience will be punished as a contempt by the
above-named Court.
WITNESS:

THE HONORABLE JUDGES of the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, this J_j

day of July in the year of our Lord One Thousand

Nine Hundred and Eighty-Five.
ATTEST, my hand and the seal of said Court the day
and year last above written.

ri. WXON BINDLEY
Clerk
By

J
K^4-LJI

~

J

J2JAC±&QJSLA

Deputy Q e r k J

FEB 141986
H. Dixoa Hindiey, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-82-5220

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

The matter pending before the Court in the above-referenced
proceeding is the defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion
for a Protective Order, wherein the City seeks to relieve a
third party, Utah Power and Light, from the obligation to respond
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated July 11, 1985, issued and served
at the request of the plaintiff.

The matter of the type of

discovery sought by the proposed inquiry directed at Utah Power
and Light has been before the Court on at least two prior occasions.
On those prior occasions the Court has refused to allow the
inquiry, and has granted the protective relief sought, or on
the last occasion, has refused to reconsider a prior Order.
At the latest hearing, all interested parties appeared and argued
their respective positions.

It was clear to the Court that

the Court's prior rulings regarding the defendant City's Motions
for Summary Judgment are not clear as to what issues remain
for determination in this suit.

Accordingly, the Court directed

nO
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counsel to set forth their positions as to the breadth of the
Court's prior rulings on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment
regarding the remaining issues, in letter form.

The parties

have done that, and the Court has reviewed those materials.
The Court was hopeful that the capsulized versions in the aforementioned letter briefs would allow the Court to re-evaluate
the issues and resolve the questions regarding the remaining
issues for trial determination without the necessity of reviewing
all the prior Memoranda in the prior extensive files that led
up to this Court's Order dealing with the plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment which were denied, and the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied
in part. Unfortunately, such was not the case, and to adequately
advise itself regarding the reasons and basis, and more particularly
the scope and breadth of the Court's rulings regarding remaining
issues the Court has again reviewed the materials submitted
in this case by all parties.

Having accomplished that task,

and having taken into account the arguments of the parties,
the Court makes the following Memorandum Decision.
As to the position of the parties as to the scope and breadth
of the Court's ruling on the defendant City's Motions for Summary
Judgment, the position asserted by Salt Lake City is correct.
Whether or not the benefits received by the plaintiff from the
defendant bears any relationship to the taxes paid is not an

LITTLE AMERICA V. CITY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

issue that remains for determination.

The Court's prior rulings

on the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such
a claim, and by this Memorandum any ambiguity contained in either
the Memorandum Decision or the subsequent Order signed by the
Court is resolved.

The only remaining issue is whether or not

the tax classification in question is arbitrary and/or discriminatory
as applied.
Based upon the foregoing clarification of the Court's prior
Orders, the information sought from non-party Utah Power and
Light to which the defendant City objects and seeks a protective
order is not material nor relevant to the remaining issues,
and therefore the protective order sought by the City should
be granted.
Counsel for the City is requested to prepare an appropriate
Order which encompasses not only this^Court's ruling on the
requested protective order, but specifically identifies in accordance
with the foregoing discussions the is^rue remaining for determination.
Dated this

/3

day of

?IMOTHYxR. HANSON
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HMMJ5Y
a?rt _

fiy f ^ T ^ ^
£>apur, Oi&f%
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this_

.day of February, 1986:

Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger F. Cutler
Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
100 City & County Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John Fellows
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

84133

Kent M. Winterholler
185 S. State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul H. Proctor
Attorneys for Utah Power and Light
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340
P. O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

«J

001128

Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Little America Hotel Corporation
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-8987

SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH

MAR 22 4 si PHf83
t

'H. DIXON HINDLEY CLERK
y'ln
OIST. COURT?;

' ^

OcFUTYCLEfiiT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, et al.,

AFFIDAVIT OF MERRILL R. NORMAN

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C 82-5220

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake)
Comes now Merrill R. Norman, who having been first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and saith as follows:

1.

Fox & Company is a national partnership of certified public account-

ants, with its Utah office located at 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

The affiant is a partner of said company and himself a duly licensed

certified public accountant in the state of Utah.

o
o^*ftO
1

2.

Affiant has received advance education degrees including a Bachelor

of Science in Accounting, Masters of Business Administration and additional
post

graduate

work

partner-in-charge

in

finance

and

economics.

Affiant

is currently

the

of the Business Advisory Services in the Salt Lake City

office which provides consulting
seven western states.

services of various types for clients in

Affiant's experience includes financial, industrial and

governmental audits, feasibility studies, utility rate regulation, investigative accounting, and general business consulting.

Affiant has qualified as an

expert and testified before federal and state courts, Public Service Commissions in various states, Securities and Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue
Service, and a Special Presidential Commission on Funding of the Central Utah
Project.

Affiant has performed engagements relative to the measurement of the

impact of tax limitation upon cities and towns within the state of Utah, and
other municipal consulting type engagements.

Affiant has provided consulting

services of various types to the hotel industry including the Little America
Hotel group, the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel, Cottontree Inn, etc.
3.

Prior to June 1, 1982, affiant was contacted, hired and retained by

Little America Hotel Corporation (LAHCO) to be an expert witness in the abovecaptioned litigation.

Among other purposes, he was retained for the purpose

of evaluating the discriminatory nature and economic impact of the proposed
innkeeper license tax to be levied upon hotels, motels, inns and like or
similar accommodations within Salt Late City (SLC).

Affiant has undertaken to

use his expert knowledge and accounting background to evaluate those issues.

o,oo^

Affiant's services and those of his firm were retained

in anticipation of

litigation and preparation for trial and pretrial motions.

Affiant has access

to all accounting and tax records of LAHCO, and has utilized such records in
the development of his opinions relating to this matter.
4.
Director

Affiant
of

has

the

SLC

reviewed

the

affidavit

International

Airport

of

Louis

(airport

E. Miller,

authority),

Acting

filed

by

defendants in this case, and the financial reports of SLC Corporation, which
contain financial information as to the operations of the airport authority,
for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981.
5.

Based on his review of the financial information and as an expert,

affiant states that the airport authority is operated as an enterprise fund of
SLC.

As an enterprise fund, the airport is a self-supporting activity within

the SLC government which renders service on a user-charge basis.

The airport

authority derives its revenues from sales and charges for various services
provided at the airport.

Operating costs, including general obligation bonds

(both interest and principal), are paid for by these revenues.
revenues

have

consistently

exceeded

costs,

resulting

in

Historically,

net

income

of

$3,211,737 in 1979, $3,835,256 in 1980, and $3,078,798 in 1981.
6.
airport
generate

In addition to income generated from its principal activities, the
authority
sales

contracts with concessionaires whose business

tax

for

the

general

fund

of

SLC.

As

a

activities

self-supporting

activity, the airport authority provides a necessary link between SLC and the
outside world.

nO»ftV
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7.
revenues

Hotel and motel owners are not
originating

International
larly

those

from

Airport.

travelers

and

employees

A substantial portion of

businesses

that

cater

commerce, derives direct benefit.
the airport

the sole beneficiaries of ancillary

also benefit.

to

associated

the

SLC

local enterprise, particu-

out-of-town

travelers

Likewise, local residents

The governmental

with

and

interstate

leaving SLC via

sector also benefits, since the

airport provides transportation means for tourists and other types of incoming
travelers who generate additional tax revenues.
8.

The use of a special tax on hotels and motels to attempt recovery of

costs of the airport (if they were not entirely recovered from airport authority revenues) would discriminate

against hotel and motel guests arriving in

SLC by use of other forms of transportation (i.e., car, bus, train).
9.
airport

Defendant claims that SLC Corporation expends funds on behalf of the
for which it is not reimbursed.

Affiant

is not aware of any reason

why the city cannot levy fees on the airport to obtain reimbursement.
10.

If there

are

some unreimbursed

airport-related

expenditures

on the

part of the SLC general fund, then residents and hotel/motel guests share the
unreimbursed
perty.

costs through existing general

fund

taxes i.e., sales and pro-

To levy taxes on hotel/motel guests only for these unreimbursed costs

places a discriminatory burden on them.
11.

Affiant

has

reviewed

the

affidavit

of

E.L.

"Bud"

Willoughby

who

claims that the "highly transient nature of SLC hotel and motel guests renders
hotels and motels susceptible to a high degree of criminal activity11 and that
"the high degree of transiency occurring by hotel residents often makes more
difficult the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases occurring within
hotels."

-5-

12.

Affiant is of the opinion that guests of the LAHCO and many other

hotels receive proportionately fewer benefits from the SLC Police Department
(SLPD) than do residents or nonhotel visitors to SLC.

This is attributed to

the fact that LAHCO, as well as many other hotels, provides an extensive
security force on the premises for the protection of their guests.

Affiant

has quantified the benefits LAHCO guests derive from the SLPD by two different
methods:
a.

First, the yearly utilization of the SLPD by LAHCO has been

measured by comparing total police calls to LAHCO to total police calls
made by the SLPD (Method I, see Exhibit 1). The results show that LAHCO
accounts for .001670 of all calls for 1981.
b.
acreage.

Second, the average acreage of the LAHCO is compared to all SLC
The

ratio

is

then multiplied

by

a

factor

to

reflect

the

increased police protection needed in the downtown area (Method II, see
Exhibit 1). LAHCO accounts for .001656 of all calls in SLC.
c.

The average of these two measurements of SLPD utilization by

LAHCO is .001663 (See Exhibit 1).
13.

Total police department expenditures for 1979, 1980 and 1981 total

$44,479,418 (see Exhibit 3). Applying the average percentage of SLPD utilization by LAHCO, determined by the two methods, to the SLPD expenditures estimates LAHCO1s cost of police services, which amounts to $73,969 (see Exhibit
2).

The same exhibit compares this cost to what was actually paid by LAHCO

for the same period.

Total taxes paid to SLC general fund by LAHCO for the

same period total $808,980 (see Exhibit 4 ) . Police department expenditures as
a

percent

of

total

general

fund

expenditures

for

the

same

period

-6-

(see Exhibit

3) equal 26.54%.

Assuming a proportionate distribution of taxes

paid by LAHCO, raxes paid for tin- nitration of the SLPD Im
would be $214,703.
based on ut
4

t-*.' .*..

-h,

14.

I'-'M through 1981

Comparing this to the total police expenditures for LAHCO

itilization ^ • r-f-u police calls reveals that for the years 1979
.-

•

•

ice services of $JAO v 734.

In addition to paying more than, their proportionate share of police

department

expenditures, guests at LAHCO pay approximately

$100,000 per year

for its own security force on the premises.
Affiant has compared the oer

15.

Exhibi t 5 demonstrates that Hi: re

.

capita SLPD call rare ro that of LAHCO.
.- > - •• . n* * - *

.

-

guests is 39%

of the overall rate for SLC.
16.

LAHCO guests contribute more than their fair share of the financial

burden for prov iding set vi ces of the SLPD.
17.

•

•

.

Affiant has reviewed the affidavit of Peter 0. Pederson, affiant for

SLC, who claims that "the unique nature of hotels and motels render tk lem si isceptible to high fire risk and impose unusual costs and risks upon the City
and its personnel."
IB,

Taxes

ioi

tire dt-pfn I men I services a i f paid

such services and the usage of such services.

I ir Mu- availability of

In the first instance, standard

fire-fighting equipment would service all nonhigh-rise structures and would be
paid

for

through

the

exi sting

tax

system.

High-rises, on

the other

hand,

require additional training and equipment to be maintained by the fire department.

It is erroneous to think that hotels and

m o tels

are unique in requiring

^

$

&

-7-

such support.

The fire department classifies a high-rise as being taller than

75 feet (the height of their tallest ladder).
ings in SLC over five stories in height.
high rise floor space in SLC.

Exhibit 6 identifies the build-

All hotels account for 11.5% of the

The tallest buildings in SLC are commercial

buildings, apartment buildings, condominiums, and other buildings that do not
provide SLC with either sales tax revenue or the innkeeper tax revenue for
rental or ownership of space.
protection to high-rises

Specialized fire department service to provide

is not unique to the hotel/motel

industry (which

already pays sales tax on hotel rentals while the other building are sales-tax
free as to rental or ownership costs).

An additional innkeeper tax to recover

costs of the fire department is certainly discriminatory.
19.
ideally

The fire department also provides paramedic service.
suited

for user

directly to users.
medic services.

fees.

Ambulance

Such service is

fees, for example,

are charged

Ambulance companies often provide both ambulance and para-

By currently paying a disproportionate share of fire depart-

ment costs, LAHCO already shoulders more than its share of ancillary services
such as paramedic protection for its guests and staff.

The desire to generate

additional revenues could be more fairly satisfied by alternatives that tend
to level the tax burden among all public users.
20.

Affiant has allocated total fire department expenditures for 1979,

1980 and 1981 over the ratio of the population of the LAHCO to the total
population of SLC (see Exhibit 7). Based on this allocation, LAHCOfs proportionate fire department expenditures would be $133,753.

Taxes paid by LAHCO

to the SLC general fund in the same three-year period were $808,980.

When

allocated to the fire department by the departments percentage expenditure to

total general fund expenditures, taxes paid by LAHCO
department totals $151,522.

for support of the fire

Accordingly, LAHCO's actual expenditures for fire

protection exceed its consumptive share of service and result in a subsidy to
other users in the approximate amount of $17,769.

The additional

innkeeper

tax increases this existing excess burden.
21.

Affiant has made a comparison of the per capita taxes paid to SLC by

tourists and residents (see Exhibit 9 ) .

A. similar comparison was prepared by

SLC offic i a 1 s I n c on s i d e r i ng t: he o r d i n an c e (E x h i b i t 2 J P"! a i n t i f £' ' s a i i s w e i t o
Defendent's

interrogatory,

# 1 ) , however,

the City's

comparison assumes

that

tourists do not pay property or franchise taxes.

Hotels and motels contribute

to the general fund by paying these same taxes.

Hotel and motels guests pay

these taxes in addition to all other costs of hotel service.

Affiant

has,

therefore, computed for LAHCO i n Exhibi t 9 the per capi ta property taxes ai id
franchise-business
rates.
y eai ,

I n 11 i e i i

by

guests

for

fiscal

year

1981

through

room

p r e v i o u s s t u d y, SI C a 1 s o e r i: o n e o u s 1 y £ a i 1 s t o c o n s i d e r t: h e

room tax which only hotel/motel-type businesses pay.

exclusively

area.

paid

This was done by equating 365 guest nights to one SLC resident for a

transient
used

taxes

to develop

the

tourist

industry

in

the

Salt

This tax is
Lake

County

Such tourist development benefits SLC government, businesses and

dents without requiring such parties to pay similar taxes.

resi-

The inkeeper tax

inc re a s e s t h i s i nb a 1 a nc e by p 1 a c i ng ad d i t i o na 1 t: ax b u rd en on ho t e 1 prices.
22.

Affiant is aware of changes in the assessed value of property which

will cause nonresidential property t
Revenue

and laxat, i, on, Chapter

Provision, states

in part:,, "all

S

pay additional property tax.
• - ~tr.-»nt mf

taxable

Property,

property, not

Title 59 -

Article

specifically

I. „ General
exempted

-9-

under Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed
at 20% of its reasonable fair cash value; but in implementing the exemption
for residential property provided for in that Section 2, residential property
shall be assessed at 15% of its reasonable fair cash value/1

by

23.

The above exemption, known as Proposition I, was voted on and passed

the

general

public

January 1, 1983.

on

November 2,

1982.

The

amendment

is

effective

Commercial property, which includes hotels and motels but

not apartment structures are being taxed at higher assessed values than residential properties.

Approximately 20.8% of the property taxes paid within SLC

end up in the general fund of SLC.

Under the amendment, commercial property

owners pay a larger percentage of the 20.8% of property taxes allocated to the
SLC general

fund.

administered

by

largest

expense.

Of

Salt

the remaining
Lake

Salt

County),

Lake

City

79.2% of property
public

residents

education
share

tax

(that

represent

directly

portion

the single

in educational

benefits, while hotel guests do not.
24.

Affiant has computed the impact of the iiinkeeper tax on LAHCO assum-

ing the tax was in effect for LAHCO's fiscal year ended June 30, 1981 (see
Exhibit 10). The tax would have increased the taxes paid by LAHCO to the SLC
general Fund by 42%.

The first six months the tax was in effect

through December 31) LAHCO paid $56,668.86.

(July 1

The business license fee (which

is a credit on the innkeeper tax) actually paid in 1981 was $5,107.

The inn-

keeper license tax (had it been effective for all of 1981) would have totaled
$119,737.

ooo**

25.

Overall, the tax burden borne by hotels and motels and in particular,

LAHCO Corporation, exceed the tax burden borne by any other class of taxpayer.

Exhibi t: ] 1 1 dent if ies the various types of taxes borne by various

categories of residents or individuals residing or owning businesses within
SLC boundaries.

Guests at hotels and motels are subject to three additional

taxes not levied on. others in similar circumstances.
26.

Further affiant saith naught.

Dated this 22nd day of March, 1983.

Merrill R. Norman

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

^

_ ^ day of March, 1983,

'.as

NOTARYKPUBLIC

r e s i d i n g in S?H kl(t Cfty
xp l re s : ^
My commis s i on eexp

«

&^

c\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This c e r t i f i e s

that the foregoing Affidavit

Re Norman was s e r v e d t h i s
a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t copy h e r e o f
Attorney,

d a y o f M a r c h , 19 8 3 , by
t o Roger F . C u t l e r ,

of

Merrill

hand-deliverinc

S a l t Lake C i t y

100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

84111,

a n d on J a m e s M. E l e g a n t e , PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 S o u t h
State Street,

P . O . Box 1189 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

8 4 1 4 7 , and

on Mark Van W a g o n e r , GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER, 800 K e n n e c o t t
B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h

84133.

m

(jQof)

Exhibit 1

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE C m , et al.
LAHCO UTILIZATION OF POUCH DEPARTMENT
Year ended December 31, 1981

Method I;

LAHCO police calls to total SLC police calls

Type of call (a)
Part I crimes
Part II crimes
Accidents (31), traffic
(12), and service (34)
Total Method I

Total number of calls (a)
LAHCO
SLC»

Percent of
LAHCO
to total
number of calls

59

20,850
458,319

.002638
.001302

77

48,,211

.001597

191

114,,380

.001670

55

Method II; Police Department utilization by acreage ratio
Total square miles of LAHCO (10 acres)(b)
Total square miles of SLC(c)
Ratio of LAHCO to SLC
Factor for increased police protection needed
in downtown area(a)

.015600
75,400100
.000207
8

Total Method 11

.001656

Average Method I and II

,001663

Sources:
(a) SLC Police Department - Crime Analysis Divi sion
(b) Based on 640 acres per square mile
(c) SLC Fire Department - 1981 Annual Report

Exhibit 2

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.f
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY LAHCO FOR POLICE
PROTECTION TO BENEFITS RECEIVED
YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1979 THROUGH 1981

Total police department expenditures (Exhibit 3)

$44,479,418

Portion used by LAHCO based on utilization of police
department and area covered (Exhibit 1)
Total police department expenditures for LAHCO

.001663
$

73.969

• • • • • • • ^ • K B

Taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC General Fund
(Exhibit 4)

808,980
26.54%

Police department expenditure percentage (Exhibit 3)
Taxes paid by LAHCO for the police department
Taxes paid by LAHCO in excess of proportionate benefit
received

1

214.703

i

140.734

o
QOU

^

Exhibit 3

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al*
SLC - GENERAL EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981

icai
>ar

City
Council

)
)
L

$

Mayor

Office of
Budget and
Management
Planning

- $ 977,607 $
98,192 1,236,578
314,419 1,171,965

190,412 $
369,886
609,478

City
attorney

Personnel

515,018 $
572,523
698,301

Finance
and
admini
strative
services

Fire

Police

Development
services

Parks

Public
works

Nondepartmental

Total

504,333 $ 5,664,573 $ 8,785,195 $13,046,859 $1,295,530
572,022
4,925,310 10,870,553 14,923,675 2,254,315
647,862
5,362,992 11,741,582 16,508,884 4,606,548

$ 2,962,335 $11,315,238 $2,327,120 $ 47,584,220
3,516,125 12,625,756 4,849,386
56,814,321
4,442,040 14,472,150 2,617,475
63,193,696

$412.611 $3.386.150 $1.169.776 $1.785.842 $1.724.217 $15.952.875 $31.397.330 $44.479.418 $8.156.393

$10.920.500 $38.413.144 $9.793.981 $167.592.237

»eir

:al
:en=
e-s-

^25*

2.02^

i %

1.06%

1.03%

9.52%

18.73=

26.541

4.871

6.5-i

22.92%

Nondepartmental and the total are decreased by $1,577,055 of funds transferred to special assessments and capital projects.

*e

•A
t $

SLC Corporate Annual Reports.)

5.84Z

100.001

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
TAXES PAID BY LAHCO
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981

Fiscal year
1979
1980
1981

Transient
room tax

Classification of Taxes Paid
Utility
franchise
Utah
Sales and
income tax use taxes
taxes

$242,210
314,657
359,938

$ 18,814
94,680
180,300

$

782,354 $ 42,425
951,551
45,359
1,043,113
38,266

$916.805

$293.794

$2,777,018

$126.050

Property
taxes
(Schedule 4)
$

Total

485,642
419,935
378,890

$1,571,445
1,826,182
2,000,507

$1.284.467

$5.398.134

$

$

Distribution of Taxes Paid
alt Lake City
General Fund
alt Lake City
and County
tate of Utah
ther

lource:

$

416,553

$126,050

266,377
1,018,090

293,794
2_

2,221,614
138,851

$293,794

$2,777,018

$126,050

«=Esaacd^acxss

^PsdcandngeBBB

assatsdaBBa

808,980
1,018,090
2,515,408
1,055,656

$5.398.134

LAHCO records

&

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
COMPARISON OF SLPD CALLS PER CAPITA

LAHCO

Total SLC

191

114,380

990

T 232,383

.1929

.4922

Total number of police calls for year ended
December 31, 1981 (see Exhibit 1)
Divided by per capita population
(see Exhibit 8)
Per capita call rate

Percent LAHCO rate is of total SLC (.1929 - .4922)

j

39%

k|-\f$»"

Exhibit 5

Page 1 of 2

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
BUILDINGS GREATER THAN FIVE FLOORS IN SLC

Number

of
floors
OFFICE BUILDING:
Church Office Building
Beneficial Tower
University Club
Commercial Security Building
Kennecott Building
County Complex
Mountain Bell
Walker Bank Building
Behavioral Science, U of U
Continental Bank
Deseret Building
Utah Retirement Systems
(Wildewood Tower)
Boyer Company
First Security Bank
International Inc.
Utah Bancorporation
(Valley Bank)
Boston Building
Hall of Justice
Newhouse Building
Episcopal MGM
The Tribune Builiding
Lincoln Association
City and County Building
Federal Building
Mountain Fuel
J.C. Penny Building
Bell Telephone
Boyer Gardner
Clark Learning
Hill Mangum
Phillips Petroleum
Royal Tribe
Boyer Company
Commercial Club
State Office Building
Todd & Lignell

Total office buildings

Number of
floors
above 6

Rental or ownership of
space is subject to
Sales
Innkeepers
tax
tax

30

24

NO

27
24
20
18
16
16
16
14
14
14

21
18
14
12
10
10
10
8
8
8

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

14
13
12
12

8
7
6
6

NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO

12
11
11
11

6
5
5
5
4
4
3
2
2
2
2

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

10

10
9
8
8
8
8

6
6
6
6

0
0
0

432

216

(Continued)

0

Exhibit 6
Page 2 of 2
(Continued)

Number
of
floors
HOTELS:
Little America
Hotel Marriott
Hilton Hotel
Howard Johnson Hotel
Tri-Arc Travel Lodge
Hotel Utah

Number ot
floors
above 6

16
14
13
13
13
11

10
8
7
7
7
5

80

44

17
15
12
12
9
8
8
7

11
9
6
6
3
2
2
1

88

40

15
14
14
10
10
9
8
7

9
8
8
4
4
3
2
1

_7

1

Tot a I Apartments

94

40

Total number of floors

94

340

Hotels floors as a
percentage ot total
floors

11.5%

Total Hotels
C0ND0S:
Canyon Crest
Bonneville Towers
Aztec Apartments
Zions Summit
Belvedere
Bara Investment
University Heights
Oak Crest
Total Condos
APARTMENTS:
Sunset Towers
Friendship Manor
Medical Housing, U of U
Charleston Apartments
The Stansbury
Wasatch Towers
Carlton Towers
Ben Albert Apartments
Irving Heights

Rental or ownership of
space is subject to
Sales
Innkeepers
tax
tax

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

12.9%

Source:

SLC Building and Housing Services originally supplied
Fire Department.

by SLC

Note:

Buildings greater than six floors have been selected because the
tallest ladder of the fire department is approximately 75 feet
high.

rt
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LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY LAHCO FOR FIRE
PROTECTION TO BENEFITS RECEIVED
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981

Total Fire Department expenditures (Exhibit 3)

$31,397,330

Portion used by LAHCO based on population ratio of
LAHCO to SLC (Exhibit 8)

.00426

Total Fire Department expenditure for LAHCO

133,753

Taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC General Fund
(Exhibit 4)

808,980

Average Fire Department Expenditure percentage
(Exhibit 3)

18.73%
151,522

Taxes paid by LAHCO for the Fire Department
Taxes paid by LAHCO in excess of proportionate
benefit received

$

17,769

o'00'

Exhibit 8

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
POPULATION RATIO ANALYSIS

LAHCO (a)

Total number of guest nights - FYE June 30, 1982
Divided by total number of days

314,214
365

Average number of guests at a given time

861

Total number of employees on payroll

540

Times number of hours per week (40/168)

.238

Average number of employees at a given time

129

Average population of LAHCO

990

Salt Lake City

Resident population of SLC(b)
Additional daytime population of SLC
[137,000 x 10/24 (hours in SLC)](c)
Population of all hotel guests(d)

163,000

Average population of SLC

232,383

Population ratio of LAHCO to SLC
(990 - 232,383)

57,083
12,300

,00426

Sources:
(a) LAHCO Records
(b) 1980 Census
(c) SLC Planning and Zoning Department
(d) Office of the Mayor - Innkeeper License Tax Proposal (Exhibit 4-G
answer to interrogatories #1)

bxnibit y

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.f
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY SLC RESIDENTS
TO PER CAPITA TAXES PAID BY LAHCO GUESTS
Year ended June 30, 1981
LAHCO guests
(per capita)

Type of tax
Sales
Property
Franchise/business

$ 75 (c)
220 (b)
22 (b)

Residents
(per capita)(a)
$ 46
58
26

130
Transient room

Innkeeper tax

735
139 (b)
874

Note:

130
$130

Property and franchise/business taxes have been adjusted for the
nonovernight room area, by assuming that only 50% of these taxes
is attributable to the overnight room accomodations.
In the
opinion of the affiant this is a conservative estimate.

Sources:

(a)

"Innkeeper License Tax, A Revenue Alternative,11 prepared
by Albert E. Haines, Chief Administration Officer of SLC
Corporation, May 19, 1982
(Exhibit 4-G answers to
interrogatories #1).

(b)

LAHCO records. See Exhibit 8 for per capita hotel guests
and employees. See Exhibit 4 for break down of taxes paid
by LAHCO in 1981.

(c)

Same sources as (a), however, if LAHCO per capita sales
amounts are used, the tourist sales tax would be $182.

Exhibit 10

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID TO THE SLC GENERAL FUND BY LAHCO
Year ended June 30, 1981
1981 taxes paid
Assuming
innkeeper
Actual
tax in effect

Type of tax
Sales and use

$156,467

$156,467

Utility franchise

38,266

38,266

Property

74,062

74,062

Business license
Innkeeper license tax

5,107
-

$273.902

Percentage increase in taxes paid to SLC
by LAHCO in 1981 if innkeeper tax in effect

Percentage Increase in business license taxes for
innkeepers under innkeeper license tax
($119,737 - $5,107)

-

119,737
$388.532

42%

2.345%

Source:

LAHCO records.

Note:

The first six months the innkeeper tax was imposed by the City,
LAHCO paid $56,668.86.

Exhibit 11
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.,
V8«

SALT LAKE CITY, et al.
Taxes paid by
residents of

Utility, business and
franchise tax (c)

Sales tax (b)

Property tax (a)

Transient room
tax (e)

Innkeeper tax (d)

Residents pay for tax
through rent or if
owned they pay direct.

No sales tax is paid on
payments made for either
renting or buying.

Tax paid either direct to
utilities or through rent,

No tax,

No tax.

Occupants pay the
property tax of the
building through rent
or lease payments.

Mo sales tax is paid
on the rental or
lease of office space.

Occupants pay tax on
utilities direct or
through rent or lease
payments.

No tax.

No tax.

Apartment8

Renters pay property
through their rent.

No sales tax on
apartment rent.

Renters pay the tax
either through rent or
direct to the utility.

No tax.

No tax.

Residents

Residents pay property
tax.

No sales tax on
house payment.

Residents pay the tax
direct to the utility.

No tax.

No tax.

Hotel/motels

Guests pay property
tax through room rates.

Guests pay sales tax
on daily room rates.

Guests pay the tax
through the room rates.

Guests pay through
a tax on room rates.

Guests pay the tax
through room rates.

Condominiums

Office
buildings

Sources:
(a)

Residential property receives
effective January 1, 1983.

a 23% break

in assessed

values

compared

to nonresidential

property

due

to passage

of

Proposition

1

(b)

Even though all people pay a 3% sales tax on goods, hotel/motel customers, by nature, are forced to eat out and, therefore, pay sales tax
on

(c)

6% of utility usage.

(d)
(e)

1% of room revenue.
Tax revenues are used to generate tourism which benefits the hotels and motels. These same taxes provide employment to city residents
which enchances the SLC tax base through increases in virtually all categories of tax revenues.

labor for food preparation, serving, cleaning etc., while those who eat at home do not pay tax on the labor, etc.

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
SALT U . r S OCUMTY. UTAH
***:»» hwosi.

ItaB

4WPH'B3

•H.OtfOMHi.'sDLtY CLERK
ROGER F .

CUTLER

'

OEPUTY CLERK

S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendants
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:

535-7788

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, et al,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
j

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
TRI-ARC HOTEL ASSOCIATES'
AND HOLIDAY INNS, INC.'S
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS'
SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES

)

Civil No. C 82-5220

VS.

SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

)

COMES NOW the defendants and object to the plaintiffs TriArc Hotel Associates and Holiday Inns., Inc.'s answers to
defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories.
The objection is made and based upon the fact that the said
answers are evasive, unresponsive, and fail to fully set forth
the discoverable information
requested.
na^:
DATED this

J-f

day of March ,_.lS8-3-*

)GER F./CTJTLER ,«'
ROGER
i l t Lalce
Ci
Salt
Lalce City
Attorney
Attorney for Defendants

x

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Defendants' Objection to Tri-Arc Hotels Associates' and Holiday
Inn, Inc.'s Answer to Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories
to Lon Rodney Kump, RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, 323 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Dorothy C. Pleshe, GREEN, CALLISTER &
NEBEKER, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; and
to James M. Elegante, PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 South State
Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, by depositing
the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this ^ ^ l ^ ^ day of
March, 1983.

cc71
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

OREM CITY,
a Corporation,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4039

Plaintiff,

HEMQiymDUM
1

vs.

and
QRDE3 SZ

DEE PYNE,

PSC;ESIOK

P?$MIS?A1>

Defendant.

Dee Pyne was charged with the crime of a misdemeanor in
failing to pay a license tax to Orem City for a automobile business
operated by him in Orem.

He was convicted in the Orem City Court

and has appealed his conviction to the District Court, claiming
that the license ordinance is void as to him.
The defendant's appeal entitles him to a trial de novo.

He

has entered anew a plea of not guilty, but has stipulated that
during the time charged in the complaint he conducted a used car
business and made sales subject to the sales tax imposed by the
State of Utah; and that he has not paid any Orem City license tax.
He now moves the court for a dismissal of the complaint, solely on
the ground that the ordinance is invalid in imposing any tax on his
used car sales business.
Ordinance No. 26 of Orem City is the ordinance in question.
It was enacted under the authority given to cities by Section 10-8-80,
U.C.A. 1953, to tax businesses for revenue purposes; provided,
however, "that all such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in
respect to the class upon which they are imposed."

The ordinance

declares that its only purpose is to raise revenue.
Section 3 of the ordinance levies a tax of 1/10 of 1% on the
gross sales of businesses in Orem City engaged in selling tangible
personal property, where such sales are subject to the Utah State
sales tax, with a minimum of §6.25 per quarterryear and a maximum
of $75.00 for the same period.

^* " OQ

If the defendant's business is covered at all it is covered
by this general Section, and not by any specific provision of the
ordinance.
The law presumes that the ordinance is valid until the contrary is shown.

However, city licensing ordinances enacted for

tax purposes must be strictly construed, and in cases of reasonable
doubt, the construction should be against the government.

Miller v.

Standard Nut Margarine Co. 284 US 498, 52 S Ct 260, 263, 76 L Ed 422.
Appeal of School District of City of Allentown (1952) 370 Pa 161,
87 A 2d 480.
The principal claim for invalidity is that the ordinance is
discriminatory and arbitrary in its application to defendant's
business.
In Matthews v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P 303, at page 227 of
the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court saidi "Neither the constitution
nor the statute authorizes. . . ordinances, . . . to tax citizens
arbitrarily and unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation.
Uniust and illegal discrimination between persona, in taxation, and
the denial of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of the
constitution of this state, and of the United States."
As to what constitutes illegal and unjust discrimination in
taxation, our Court has held: "Discrimination is the essence of
classification and does violence to the constitution only when the
basis upon which it is founded is unreasonable.

In fixing the limits

of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion and this
court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the law.
Our function is to determine whether an enactment operates equally
upon all persons similarly situated.

If it does then the discrimi-

nation is within permissible legislative limits.

If it does not,

then the discrimination would be without reasonable basis and the
act does not meet the test of constitutionality."

Slater v. salt

Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P 2d 153.

30
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This indicates that the classification by the legislative
body must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with uniformity
upon similar kinds of businesses and with substantial equality of
the tax burden to all members of the same class.

The imposition

of taxes which are to a substantial degree unequal in their operation upon similar kinds of businesses is prohibited.
What is the situation with respect to discrimination and
reasonableness as this ordinance is written and may be applied and
enforced?
Section 1 of the ordinance lists 201 purported businesses
for taxation and fixes a tax rate for each.

A few of these names

do not indicate businesses at all and are beyond the power of the
City to tax for revenue purposes.

Excluding these few, the remainder

represent legitimate businesses, subject to taxation for revenue
purposes.

Even here, however, the lack of definitions renders

the application of the ordinance and the tax uncertain, confusing,
and perhaps inequitable.

And since this section and the ordinance

as a whole does not attempt to tax all business within the city, it
may well be questioned as to any equality in spreading the tax burden.
Section 3, standing alone, appears to be fair, reasonable,
and definite in its application to all businesses generally in Orem
City selling tangible personal property.

Shis is a reasonable and

proper classification fixed by the City.

The difficulty arises

when Section 1 is considered along with Section 3; because Section 1
places several businesses, that would otherwise be covered by
Section 3, on a flat annual fee basis that may be only one-twelfth
as much as if they were on the gross sales basis, and taxable under
Section 3.

Why should one business selling tangible personal pro-

perty at retail be subjected to a tax of up to §300.00 per year,
while other businesses (also selling tangible personal property at
retail) such as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement plant,
creamery, butcher shop, photography shop, or a dealer specializing in
the sale of goods made in Japan, Bong Kong, Formosa, China, or India,
doing the same volume of business, be taxed $25.00?
- 3 -

_^

To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a reasonable
classification of businesses generally for taxation and fix a tax
rate therefore based on gross sales with certain minimum and maximum
amounts, and by another section of the same ordinance exclude from
the operation of Section 3, certain businesses naturally falling
within its classification, and apply to such excluded businesses a
tax rate on a flat annual basis that can not possibly be more than
the minimum for the unexcluded businesses is unreasonable, arbitrary,
and discriminatory.

Such exclusion assures to the excluded busi-

nesses a concession not accorded to other businesses similarly
situated.
It is clear that the ordinance is void as it applies to the
defendant's business in this case, and the motion for dismissal is
granted.
This ruling is limited to the question presented by the
defendant's motion.

It is not within the province of the court at

this time to pass on the validity of the entire ordinance.
be valid as to some businesses and invalid as to others.

It may

As herein-

above stated, in a few instances there seems to be an entire absence
of authority for the city to impose any tax at all for revenue purposes.
Dated this 3rd day of August, 1964.

Maurice Harding, Jud^e*

"%-*»

17-31-1. Authority of county commissioners to establish,
promote and finance bureaus.
In addition to the powers elsewhere conferred the board of county commissioners is hereby authorized and empowered to establish, promote and finance
recreational, tourist and convention bureaus.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 1; 1979, ch. 68,
§ 1.

Cross-References. — Travel development,
Chapter 16 of Title 63.

17-31-2. Imposition of transient room tax.
They may raise revenue by the imposition of a transient room tax which
shall not exceed three per cent of the rent for every occupancy of a suite, room
or rooms on all persons, companies, corporations, or other like and similar
persons, groups or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like and similar public accomodations, and from time to time
increase or decrease such levy as is necessary or desirable, and shall regulate
the same by ordinance.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 2; 1975, ch. 114,
§ 1*
Meaning of ?<They". — The term 'They,"

referred to in this section, apparently means
the county commissioners.

17-31-3, Purpose of tax — Purchase or lease of facilities —
Issuance of bonds.
(1) A transient room tax as provided for in this act, may be imposed for the
purposes of establishing, financing and promoting recreational, tourist and
convention bureaus,
(2) Counties receiving at least $250,000 annually from proceeds of the transient room tax may utilize not more than one-third of the tax for the purpose
of acquiring, leasing, constructing, furnishing or maintaining convention
meeting rooms, exhibit halls, visitor information centers, museums, and other
facilities associated with the activities of said bureaus and for the acquisition
or lease of land required for or related to these purposes.
(3) The board of county commissioners may issue bonds under the provisions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act to pay any costs incurred for the purposes set forth in Subsection (2) of this section, and may pledge the entire
proceeds of the transient room tax as provided in this act to the payment of
principal, interest, premiums and necessary reserves for any such bonds, provided that no bonds shall be issued as provided in this act unless the average
annual debt service, including provisions for reserves, on those bonds and on
all outstanding bonds to which the transient room tax is pledged is less than
one-third of the amounts derived from the proceeds of the transient room tax
in the fiscal year of the county next preceding the date of issuance of those
bonds, and provided further that when the proceeds of the transient room tax
are not needed for payment of principal, interest, premiums and reserves on
bonds issued as provided herein, those proceeds shall be utilized as provided in
Subsections (1) and (2) of this section.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 3; 1979, ch. 68,
§ 2.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in Suosection (1), means Laws
1965, ch. 35, which appears as §§ 17-31-1 to
17-31-7.

The term "this act," referred to in Subsection
(3), means Laws 1979, ch. 68, which appears as
§§ 17-31-1 and 17-31-3.
Utah Municipal Bond Act. — See
§ n.14.22 and notes thereto.

17-31-4. Reserve fund authorized — Use of collected
funds.
The board of county commissioners is hereby authorized and empowered to
create a reserve fund and any funds collected but not expended during any
fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund of the governing bodies but
shall be retained in a special fund to be used in accordance with this act.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". — See first para-

graph of note under same catchline following
§ 17-31-3.

17-31-5. "Transient" defined.
For the purpose of this act the term "transient" is defined as any person who
occupies any suite, room or rooms in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn or similar
public accommodation for fewer than thirty consecutive days.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". — See first para-

graph of note under same catchline following
§ 17-31-3.

17-31-6. Manner of collection of tax.
Such tax shall be levied at the same time and collected in the same manner
as is provided in Title 11, Chapter 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, "The Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law of Utah."
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 6.

17-31-1. Board authorized to establish and promote bureau and finance with transient room tax.
(1) In addition to the powers elsewhere conferred the Board of County Commissioners may establish, promote, and finance recreational, tourist, and convention bureaus.
(2) Any Board of County Commissioners may raise revenue by the imposition of a transient room tax under § 59-12-301.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 1; 1979, ch. 68,
§ 1; 1987, ch. 5, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, designated
the former provisions as set out in the bound
volume as Subsection (1) and in that subsection substituted "may" for "is hereby autho-

rized and empowered to"; added, present Subsection (2); and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-2. Purpose of tax — Purchase or lease of facilities —
Issuance of bonds.
(1) A transient room tax provided for in § 59-12-301, may be imposed for
the purposes of establishing, financing, and promoting recreational, tourist,
and convention bureaus*
(2) Counties receiving at least $250,000 annually from proceeds of the transient room tax may utilize not more than Vs of the tax for the purpose of
acquiring, leasing, constructing, furnishing, or maintaining convention meeting rooms, exhibit halls, visitor information centers, museums, and other
facilities associated with the activities of said bureaus and for the acquisition
or lease of land required for or related to these purposes.
(3) The Board of County Commissioners may issue bonds under the provisions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, Chapter 14, Title 11, to pay any costs
incurred for the purposes set forth in Subsection (2), and may pledge the
entire proceeds of the transient room tax as provided in § 59-12-301 to the
payment of principal, interest, premiums, and necessary reserves for any such
bonds. No bonds may be issued as provided in this section unless the average
annual debt service, including provisions for reserves, on those bonds and on
all outstanding bonds to which the transient room tax is pledged is less than
Va of the amounts derived from the proceeds of the transient room tax in the
fiscal year of the county next preceding the date of issuance of those bonds.
When the proceeds of the transient room tax are not needed for payment of
principal, interest, premiums, and reserves on bonds issued as provided in this
section, those proceeds shall be utilized as provided in Subsections (1) and (2).
History: I*. 1965, ch. 35, § 3; 1979, ch. 68,
§ 2; C. 1953, 17-31-3; renumbered by L.
1987, ch. 5, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 17-31-3; in Subsection (1) and (3) substituted
w
§ 59-12-301" for "this act"; and made minor

changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 13
renumbered the former provisions of this section, which now appear as § 59-12-301.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: 'This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-3. Reserve fund authorized — Use of collected
funds.
The Board of County Commissioners may create a reserve fund and any
funds collected but not expended during any fiscal year shall not revert to the
general fund of the governing bodies but shall be retained in a special fund to
be used in accordance with §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 4; C. 1953,
17-31-4; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 17-31-4; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor
changes in phraseology.

Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 14
renumbered the former provisions of this section, which now appear as § 17-31-2.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-4. "Transient" defined.
For the purpose of §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5 "transient" means any person who occupies any suite, room, or rooms in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn,
or similar public accommodation for fewer than 30 consecutive days.
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 5; C. 1953,
17-31-5; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 16.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 17-31-5; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.

Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 15
renumbered the former provisions of this section, which now appear as § 17-31-3.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-5. General authority and powers of county commissioners.
The Board of County Commissioners may do and perform any and all other
acts and things necessary, convenient, desirable, or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5.
History? L- 1965, ch. 35, § 7; C. 1953,
17-31-7; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 17-31-7; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.

Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 16
renumbered the former provisions of this section, which now appear as § 17-31-4.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-6. Renumbered.
Compiler's Notes. — This section was renumbered as § 59-12-302 by Laws 1987, ch. 5,
§ 17.

Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

17-31-7. Renumbered.
Compiler's Notes. — This section was renumbered as § 17-31-5 by Laws 1987, ch. 5,
§ 18.

Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective
operation to January 1, 1987."

THE UNIFORM LOCAL SALES AND USE TAX ACT
59-12-201. Short title.
This part shall be known as "The Local Sales and Use Tax Act."
History; L. 1987, ch. 5, § 2.

59-12-202. Purpose and intent.
It is the purpose of this part to provide the counties, cities, and towns of the
state with an added source of revenue and to thereby assist them to meet their
growing financial needs. It is the legislative intent that this added revenue be
used to the greatest possible extent by the counties, cities, and towns to finance their capital outlay requirements and to service their bonded indebtedness.
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 3.

59-12-203. County, city and town may levy tax — Exception — Contracts p u r s u a n t to Interlocal Co-operation A c t
Any county, city, or town may levy a sales and use tax under this part. Any
county, city, or town which elects to levy such sales and use tax may enter
into agreements authorized by Chapter 13, Title 11, the Interlocal Cooperation Act, and may use any or all of the revenues derived from the imposition of
such tax for the mutual benefit of local governments which elect to contract
with one another pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act.
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 4.

59-12-204. Sales tax provisions required in county sales
and use tax ordinance — Additional county or
municipal taxes authorized.
(1) The tax ordinance adopted pursuant to this part shall impose a tax upon
those items listed in § 59-12-103.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(2), such tax ordinance shall
include a provision imposing a tax upon every retail sale of items listed in
§ 59-12-103 made within a county including areas contained within the cities
and towns thereof at the rate of ZU% or any fractional part of such 2U% of the
purchase price paid or charged.
(3) In addition to the 3U% or any fractional part of such 3A% tax authorized
by this section, any county, city, or town within a transit district organized
under Chapter 20, Title 11, may impose a sales and use tax of V4of 1% to fund
a public transportation system only if the governing body of the county, city,
or town by resolution, submits the proposal to all the qualified voters within
the county, city, or town for approval at a general or special election conducted in the manner provided by statute. Notice of any such election shall be
given by the county, city, or town governing body 15 days in advance in the
manner prescribed by statute. If a majority of the voters voting in such election approve the proposal, it shall become effective on the date provided by the
county, city, or town governing body. This subsection may not be construed to
require an election in jurisdictions where voters have previously approved a
transit district sales or use tax.

(4) Such tax ordinance shall include provisions substantially the same as
those contained in Part 1, Chapter 12, Title 59, insofar as they relate to sales
or use tax, except that the name of the county as the taxing agency shall be
substituted for that of the state where necessary for the purpose of this part
and that an additional license is not required if one has been or is issued
under § 59-12-106.
(5) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that the county shall contract, prior to the effective date of the ordinance, with the commission to
perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the ordinance.
(6) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that the sale, storage, use,
or other consumption of tangible personal property, the purchase price or the
cost of which has been subject to sales or use tax under a sales and use tax
ordinance enacted in accordance with this part by any county, city, or town in
any other county in this state, shall be exempt from the tax due under this
ordinance.
(7) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that any person subject to
the provisions of a city or town sales and use tax shall be exempt from the
county sales and use tax if the city or town sales and use tax is levied under
an ordinance including provisions in substance as follows:
(a) a provision imposing a tax upon every retail sale of items listed in
§ 59-12-103 made within the city or town at the rate imposed by the
county in which it is situated pursuant to Subsection (2);
(b) provisions substantially the same as those contained in Part 1,
Chapter 12, Title 59, insofar as they relate to sales and use taxes, except
that the name of the city or town as the taxing agency shall be substituted for that of the state where necessary for the purposes of this part;
(c) a provision that the city or town shall contract prior to the effective
date of the city or town sales and use tax ordinance with the commission
to perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the
sales and use tax ordinance of the city or town;
(d) a provision that the sale, storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal property, the gross receipts from the sale of or the cost of
which has been subject to sales or use tax under a sales and use tax
ordinance enacted in accordance with this part by any county other than
the county in which the city or town is located, or city or town in this
state, shall be exempt from the tax; and
(e) a provision that the amount of any tax paid under Part 1, Chapter
12, Title 59 shall not be included as a part of the purchase price paid or
charged for a taxable item hereunder.
(8) (a) In addition to the other taxes provided for, a city or town in which
the transient room capacity equals or exceeds the permanent census population may impose a sales tax of up to 1% subject to exemptions provided
for in § 59-12-104, and shall exempt from that additional tax, wholesale
sales and sales of single items for which consideration paid is $2,500 or
more.
(b) An amount equal to the total of any costs incurred by the state in
connection with the implementation of Subsection (a) which exceed, in
any year, the revenues received by the state from its collection fees received in connection with the implementation of Subsection (a) shall be
paid over to the state General Fund by the cities and towns which impose
the tax provided for in Subsection (a). Payment costs shall be allocated
proportionally among those cities and towns according to the amount of
revenue the respective cities and towns generate in that year through
imposition of that tax.
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 5.

TRANSIENT ROOM TAX
59-12-301. Transient room tax — Rate,
Any Board of County Commissioners may raise revenue by the imposition
of a transient room tax. This tax may not exceed 3% of the rent for every
occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms on ail persons, companies, corporations,
or other like and similar persons, groups, or organizations doing business as
motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, or like and similar public accommodations.
Any Board of County Commissioners may, from time to .time, increase or
decrease such transient room tax as necessary or desirable, and shall regulate
the same by ordinance.
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § VT

59-12-302. Manner of collection of tax.
The transient room tax shall be levied at the same time and collected in the
same manner as is provided in Part 2, Chapter 12, Title 59.
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 17.

